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1Chapter 1
Introduction
There is little doubt that the world population will grow. The most recent United Nations
report on the development of the global population, the world population prospects (UN
2015), reveals that even in the most restrictive estimation trajectory population numbers
worldwide will rise for at least another 35 years. However more likely, they will rise far
beyond 2050 as predicted by the medium variant which sees the peak not to occur before
2100. Even though one may question the precision of century-spanning estimates, two
things about the presented population development are remarkable and worth to note.
The rst is concerned about where additional people are located and the next are the
dening bounds of future trajectories as published by the United Nations.
In the medium variant, the latest revision projects an additional 2.2 billion people in
the world by 2050. However, even the simplest division into developed and developing
economies shows that almost all people will be added in developing countries. The popu-
lation of developed countries is projected to maintain fairly stable at 1.3 billion. Thus, the
increase of people is located in those countries at the lower end of the development ladder,
a situation that will certainly put pressure on societal and economic development in these
countries.
However, while the location of additional people is easily and (most likely correctly)
established - at least within the mentioned general division of country groups- the precise
amount is by far harder to predict. The United Nations world population prospects
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Figure 11: World population development for di¤erent fertility scenarios,
2000-2060
therefore present next to the medium also a high and a low variant. Figure 11 presents a
replication of the di¤erent variants based on data from the report for the years 2000 - 2060.
The di¤erence projected between the high and the low variant within ve years (by 2020)
amounts already to 350 Million people, or the current population of the United States. A
bit further down the road, by mid-century, this di¤erence already amounts to 2.6 billion
people (10.9 vs 8.3), a number that has vast impacts on resources, the environment and
human development. Even though there is no doubt that numbers of additional people
in the presented dimensions do a¤ect human and environmental development and the
pressure to understand their driving forces are high, it remains largely di¢ cult to map
future population developments with precision. The major reason is uncertainty about the
decline in fertility rates.
The variants presented in gure 11 are based on future expected developments of
3Figure 12: Demographic transition scheme
fertility (medium variant), with a margin of half a child more (high variant) or less (low
variant) per woman. This rather exible trajectory is sensible and mirrors the literature
that debates about fertility decline. An answer to the question why fertility is the key can be
retrieved when we look at the demographic transition model. A look at this model reveals
why it is necessary to get fertility rates correctly predicted to make reliable estimates
on population growth. A classic demographic transition occurs in several steps. It is
characterized by (in principle) three phases (Coale 1984).
Naturally population growth occurs (mostly) from a di¤erence in birth and death rates
as depicted in gure 12. Now, looking at both factors in the time continuum (gure 12),
the initial stage of the demographic transition is characterized by both, high birth and high
death rates. As time passes the death rate (red line) starts to fall, which is the entry into the
second stage. The arising di¤erence between continuously high birth rates and falling death
rates increases population growth. Eventually, when the birth rate starts to fall as well,
4population growth decreases again. The whole transition enters the nal stage when birth
and death rates have reached a lower level that keeps population growth again constant
(just like at the beginning of the transition at both high and low birth and death rates).
Explanations for a decline in mortality rates are generally easier at hand than for a decline
in birth rates. As Bloom (2011) notes, "mortality decline is conventionally understood
to be reective of some combination of medical advances (...); dietary improvements; and
public health measures focused on sanitation, safe drinking water, and vector control." (p.
564) Therein also lies an explanation why mortality rates are more easily predicted and
forecasted: factors that a¤ect a decline in mortality are potentially spread internationally
conducive to international integration. Medical knowledge and technology for example
is easily transferred to di¤erent nations once developed. In other words, as "leading"
countries (e.g. industrialized countries) have already passed the stages and benetted
from the development of medical advances, these may be utilized by "late-comers" in the
transition. In contrast to mortality, the underlying causes of the decline in fertility are not
yet comprehensively understood, even more, they are subject to an intense debate (Shenk
et al. 2013).
A closer look at the economic structure of countries reveals that those that have a higher
birth rate are also those that are predominantly engaged in traditional, i.e. agricultural
or primary, activities. The simple correlation is plotted in gure 13. Thus, as empha-
sized in the economic literature, which is one strand that explains fertility development
(see below), modernization is potentially an important driver of fertility development. The
relationship shown in gure 13 is one indication for an interdependence between economic
development and modern economic structures. Another one, however, is the historic ex-
perience of already industrialized countries. When factories emerged and industries grew
during industrialization, societal change took place. And this change also entailed a decline
of birth rates during the era. However, while the onset of industrialization, its drivers
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Figure 13: Fertility levels and engagement in agricultural production
and determinants for developed economies may be pinned down, at least in retrospective,
there remains much discussion about modernization in the development economics litera-
ture on what may bring about economic growth and modernization in todays developing
economies. Though, in connection with the hypothesized connection between fertility and
modernization, an understanding of modernizations drivers would potentially directly feed
into understanding population development. This thesis sets out to contribute to an un-
derstanding of the interrelation between fertility development and modernization, which
entails structural change in the economic sense and which is an important interrelation in
development trajectories.
61.1 Fertility decline and its drivers
The main disciplines rivalling about the theories of fertility decline and advocating their
relative importance are economics, evolutionary anthropology and, perhaps obviously, de-
mography. Theoretical statements about fertility decline are usually classied into three
categories (Schellekens and van Poppel 2012). A mortality focussed strand, a cultural
transmission strand and an economic/investment strand. Since the rst rests fundamen-
tally on the idea that fertility declines after infant mortality has declined, it is also called
the classic demographic transition theory (see gure 12) dating back to Notestein (1945)
and Davis (1945). The key factor that triggers fertility decline is infant mortality (Cleland
2001, Reher and Sanz-Gimeno 2007). To match increasing child survival rates parents will
adjust (in this case lower) their fertility. Because this process is induced with a lag, popu-
lation growth rises during the adjustment period. Similarly, though stressing the relative
importance of mortality risk, Quinlan (2007) also predicts decreasing fertility rates in con-
nection with lower infant mortality. In addition to a focus on child survival, also general
mortality has been connected with fertility decisions. Unied growth theory (UGT), for
example, nds that increased lifespans, as a consequence of lower mortality, allow not only
greater payo¤s to ones own education, but also to that of children (Cervellati and Sunde
2005).
The second set of theories about fertility decline circles around the idea of the di¤u-
sion of modern cultural norms within populations (Cleland and Wilson 1987). If these
modern cultural norms are associated with fewer children their di¤usion will bring about
an ideational change that leads to a reduction of children born. Several mechanisms have
been proposed that spread cultural norms (Shenk et al. 2013). Broader social classes adopt
reproductive behavior or attitudes towards reproduction of an elite via mass media or di-
rectly through social contact (Basu 1993). A similar imitating mechanism is proposed for
7example by Richerson and Boyd (2005). Here the adoption of fertility norms takes place
because people seek prestige and are inclined to follow the habits and behavior of people
with (thought of) higher prestige. Also the inuence of social networks (Kohler et al. 2001)
and kinship (Newson et al. 2007) has been associated with the di¤usion of low fertility
norms. While contact with kin fosters existing sets of norms an increasing interaction
with non-kin might also di¤use non-kin (potentially lower fertility) ideals. Social networks
are similarly associated with the transmission of behavior or information a¤ecting fertility
norms. That is, people are more likely to adopt accepted reproductive behavior within
their social network.
The third set of theories about fertility decline are economic and investment models.
These models are mainly concerned with economic explanations for fertility decline and
associate a change in socioeconomic conditions with changing fertility behavior. Having
children is often associated with costs and benets, and investing in them (and one self) is
then connected with the decision of their quantity. Caldwells (1982) wealth ows approach
posits that depending on the economy, a child either consumes wealth (modern economy)
or provides wealth through engaging in the labor market or working at home (traditional
economy). More precisely, in traditional economies the wealth ow, the intergenerational
transfer, goes from children to their parents. As societal changes occur, and the economy
modernizes, this set up starts to lose its standing. The ow increasingly starts to reverse
as parents increase investment in their childrens education and leave larger bequests.
Alongside may also occur a reduction in the willingness to pay for the elderly while increased
educational levels enable people to save and invest in their o¤springs education. Thus,
depending on the economic environment, there are incentives either to have many or few
children. A focus on human capital and reproduction has been pioneered by Becker (1960).
His connection of rational choice theory with fertility decisions has since then been a major
theoretical ground for economic explanations of fertility decline. In the basic framework
8families optimize a utility function that incorporates both, child quantity and quality along
with other consumption. The quality of a child is usually associated with its health and/or
educational level. In a subsequent framework of overlapping generations Becker (1992)
introduces parentsinvestments in child education as a means of increasing the payo¤s over
their childrens lifetime. This e¤ect is strengthened with increasing returns to education
that are brought about by modern labor markets. These same markets also work on the
opportunity costs a family faces when raising children. As raising a child consumes time,
parents will face increasing opportunity costs depending on their own level of education
and position in the modern labour market. Therefore rising education (at the parental
level) in combination with a modern labor market is also expected to induce couples to
have fewer children.
In another strand of literature, clearly related to the economic and investment type
models, the evolution of fertility has also taken an important role. In quest to explain
poverty traps this strand of the economic development literature has turned to fertility and
population growth as potential candidates (among many others) for the explanation of these
development traps. The development or poverty trap is generally perceived as a stable,
self-reinforcing situation that maintains poor living conditions. Oldest and well known is
the trap formulated by Thomas Malthus; it dates back to the end of the 18th century
(Malthus 1798). The therein described mechanism proposes mankind to be "trapped" in
terms of economic development at around subsistence levels. Two core ingredients are
necessary for the proposition. First, the standard of living is related positively to the
growth of the population and second, one factor of production, in this case land, is xed
in supply implying decreasing returns to the other factors, such as labor. The prediction is
that a small population may enjoy a larger standard of living while the opposite holds true
for the reverse. That is either a "preventive check", i.e. the large population preventively
reduces fertility or a "positive check", which is the reduction in births and increasing death
9rates due to malnutrition, disease or famine occurs on the population size. As carefully
outlined in Galor and Weil (2000) this proposition used to be very much in line with the
experience of humankind throughout most of its history. Accordingly the standard of living
did not change much in Europe for centuries and even more, in China it is estimated that
the real wage was even higher at the beginning of the rst century than at the end of the
18th century (Kao Chang 1986). Similarly, population growth did hardly occur for long
periods of time. Livi-Bacci (1997) estimates this rate to be 0.064 % annually between year
1 and 1750 for the world. However, and ironically as Galor and Weil (2000) also note, the
situation changed right after the time of Malthus and population gures rose but still were
outpaced by output growth implying growth of per capita output throughout most of the
western countries.
The idea that population development may be related to the emergence of poverty traps,
however, remains popular also after Malthus. Nelson (1956) presents a neo-Malthusian ver-
sion essentially implying the same trap at work. However, during the 1950s this model was
designed to specically explain prolonged underdevelopment in least developed countries,
especially in Africa. It assumes income generating production that depends on investments
through savings. Further, at low income levels - in this case around subsistence - the re-
lationship between small income gains and population growth is assumed positive. This
is due to a inverse relation between income and mortality. A decrease in mortality will
thus spur population development and thus dilute any potential increases in the income
level making savings and investments impossible. The poor economy therefore remains
trapped in this so called low-level equilibrium. Besides the savings and investment channel
to increase physical capital, that in the above mechanism may not be tapped to improve
growth, another channel has been proposed in relation to population development: invest-
ments in human capital. It may be that they also follow nonconvexities and require a
certain threshold after which increasing returns take over (Azariadis and Drazen 1990).
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Both, the look at the original Malthusian ideas as well as the neo-Malthusian specic
focus on least developed countries shows that rising income initially boosts population
growth. However, at higher levels of income (i.e. the experience of advanced economies)
the opposite appears to hold. The relationship between income and fertility behavior is
thus not straight forward. Explaining both, the Malthusian stagnation and the modern
take o¤ phase is at the core of unied growth models. Unied growth theory has made use
of the quantity-quality trade-o¤ and the modernization aspect to explain fertility decline in
several ways. In e.g. Soares (2005) or Galor and Weil (1999) mortality impacts on the cost
of educating children, while in, e.g., Galor and Weil (2000) technological progress raises
returns to education.
Further, more recently, globalization has been proposed as a determinant of fertility
levels. Or, as Do et al. (2014:1) argue, "in an era of ever-increasing integration of world
markets, the role of globalization in determining fertility can no longer be ignored". Most
prominently Galor and Mountford (2008) present a model where international trade, de-
termined by Ricardian comparative advantages, leads to changes in fertility levels. The
model shows a mechanism where globalization may be a drag to the decline of developing
countries fertility rates. Theoretically international integration has also been connected
to population outcomes via slightly di¤erent channels, that, however, point to the same
underlying quantity-quality mechanism. Rees and Riezman (2012) argue that globalization
that creates market opportunities for women has an e¤ect on human capital creation, in
the way that it increases schooling among children. Contrarily, created market opportuni-
ties for men do not lead to this development. Similarly, Do et al. (2014) present a model
that comes to similar conclusions. However, they pronounce the importance of female
labor-intensive comparative advantages. In countries that have a comparative advantage
in female labor-intensive goods, the relative wage, and therefore the opportunity costs for
women, is higher. This, in connection with the Becker-type mechanism, generates lower
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fertility. To sum up, to the degree that female labor-intensive goods (Do et al. 2014) and
human capital intensive goods (Galor and Mountford 2008) are similar and globalization
creates market opportunities for women (Rees and Riezman 2012) these theories may also
empirically be picked up with more detailed trade data.
The empirical literature on fertilitys determinants has also produced ample, though
sometimes mixed, evidence for inuencing factors. Classic demographic transition theory
emphasizes the role of mortality and, especially, infant mortality. The main mechanisms
put forward are a hoarding and a replacement e¤ect. While the latter describes that parents
will try to replace a lost child, the former stresses that in anticipation of a mortality risk
more children will be born than generally desired. This strategy insures against eventual
losses. Existing studies could well establish a decline in total fertility in relation to a decline
in infant mortality. Palloni and Rafalimanana (1999) present evidence from both, country-
and individual-level data, for Latin America based on Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) data. The e¤ect of infant mortality on fertility in pooled cross-sectional time-series
data is positive with coe¢ cients between .1 and .5. More recently the link between infant
mortality and total fertility has also been established at the country level in, e.g., Lorentzen
et al. (2008). By analyzing a cross-section it is shown that infant mortality is among the
important predictors of total fertility. The latter result could also be replicated at the
country level in Angeles (2010). The similar e¤ect of infant mortality on total fertility holds
in a large cross-country sample of around 110 countries. However, while the e¤ect on total
fertility is straight forward and rather clearly established, the e¤ect on net fertility remains
ambiguous (Canning et al. 2013, Doepke 2005). That is, if infant mortality decreases
total fertility with an estimated marginal impact of anywhere between 0 and 1 net fertility
would at most remain unchanged. More likely, net fertility and thus population growth
would go up. Existing empirical evidence on the impact of infant mortality on net fertility
is unclear. While Angeles (2010) also presents estimates of a positive relation between
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infant mortality and net births, Canning et al. (2013), in a micro-level study, nd no net
e¤ects. Moreover, in their study the missing, and thus population growth neutral, impact
of infant mortality on net births can only be established once interdependent preferences
are incorporated. These are preferences where an individuals fertility choice a¤ect that
of others and consequently may magnify or increase the e¤ect compared to the previous
situation without interdependent preferences. Doepke (2005) puts forth that even though
net fertility declined alongside infant or child mortality other factors are responsible for
the observed large reductions in net fertility rates. So, while the role of mortality on net
reproduction is rather contested, its role in reducing total fertility is clearly established.
Another factor, besides infant mortality, is, as presented in Doepke (2005), education.
According to the theory, education may inuence fertility decisions in several ways. Most
often found in economic and investment models is the role of female education. Female
education may serve as a proxy for the shadow value of time and therefore be a testable
determinant for the presence of Beckers quantity-quality trade-o¤. Angeles et al. (2005),
in a micro-study of Indonesian women between 1960 and 1993, nd that indeed female
education has a negative impact on fertility rates, also after controlling for potential endo-
geneity. Similarly, Murtin (2013) reports a negative e¤ect of schooling on birth rates for
a sample of 70 countries between 1870 and 2000. The results maintain signicance in a
number of sub-samples that use di¤erent starting dates of the time series. Especially de-
veloping countries start a lot later than 1870. Further, Murtin (2013) reports a dominant
e¤ect of primary education on birth rates in the cross-country analysis. For the region of
Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) Bongaarts (2010) presents signicant negative partial relation-
ships between education and fertility. Based on descriptions of DHS data it is shown that
with rising educational attainment a) the use of contraceptives increases, b) desired family
size decreases and c) (unsurprisingly) fertility decreases. Additional country-study evi-
dence is presented in Osili and Long (2008). Based on national DHS data they nd that an
13
additional year of schooling reduces fertility by .26 births. Conversely, Geruso and Royer
(2014) nd that additional schooling in the UK contributed to less teenage pregnancy,
however, it could not reduce completed fertility. The connection between education and
social empowerment and fertility is also presented in Skirbekk and Samir (2012). However,
in this study (female) educational attainment is less interpreted as a shadow value of time
but rather as a proxy for a change of (womens) social status and therefore a di¤usion of
modern norms. All in all it appears, that especially in developing countries studies could
establish the link between female education and fertility robustly (Duo et al. 2014).1
Since the theoretical underpinning in the Becker-type model trades o¤ child quantity
(numbers) against child quality (their health and education), there have also been attempts
to more directly establish this empirically with the help of school enrollment rates and birth
rates. Historic data from around the European fertility transition has been often employed.
Dribe (2009), for example, nds a negative relation between the number of teachers and
fertility rates in Sweden between 1880 and 1930. Becker et al. (2010) make use of Prussian
historic census data and present evidence that the quantity-quality trade-o¤ existed at that
time. The dataset is compelling because a (not strictly enforced) law enabled parents to
send their children to school without punishing them when they decided not to. In a similar
vein Bleakley and Lange (2009) made use of an presumably exogenous shock to the price of
child education (i.e. child-quality). The eradication of the Hookworm disease dramatically
increased school attendance and was accompanied by a decline in fertility rates.
While female education is clearly established as an impact factor on fertility levels,
there is also evidence that the quantity-quality trade-o¤ has played a role (at least) in the
historic experience of developed countries.
Income is another factor that may well determine fertility outcomes. The socioeconomic
1However, for an account of the impact of female eduaction on fertility in developed economies during
(or even pre-) transition time see, e.g., Becker et al. (2013) for Prussia or Murphy (2010) for France.
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idea that connects income with fertility rests to a large degree on the ideas of Becker (1960,
1992). However, in the Becker setting rising income in fact induces both, demand for more
quality as well as more quantity. So declining fertility can only be achieved with relative
elasticities favoring quality demand. But rising income may theoretically also lead to an
increase of fertility. A di¤erent approach, though stressing the same point (i.e. that income
may not have a clear impact on fertility) is found in Docquier (2004). With a focus on
inequality it is argued that at the macro-level it may well depend on the distribution of
income whether fertility declines or rises. Cross-sectionally, with di¤erent income levels
there may be confounding e¤ects of income on fertility. In many cross-country empirical
studies the level of income is controlled for, however without disentangling the precise
mechanisms.2 Thus, empirical studies could mostly not establish universal impacts. Murtin
(2013), in a cross-country analysis, found that at low levels, income may be positively
related while not having much of an impact afterwards. Amarante (2014) presents opposing
ndings for a sample of Latin American countries. The level of income measured by GDP
per capita is negatively associated with fertility rates. Another recent study, Brückner
and Schwandt (2014), nds that changes in per capita GDP are positively associated with
changes in fertility, while Angeles (2010) nds the impact of GDP per capita on fertility is
dependent on covariates and estimation method.
Female labor force participation has also been a well discussed factor in the discussion
about the determinants of fertility. However, empirically it has mainly been analyzed in
the context of developed countries and the consensus about its relationship appears to be
that its impact is vastly inuenced by modern countriesinstitutional settings (Ahn and
Mira 2002). The institutional settings are related to child- or day-care opportunities as
well as nancial support to obtain these. Societal norms naturally may also inuence the
2 Income also interacts with already discussed factors. For example in the education-health relationship
(e.g. Clark and Royer 2013) it is discussed as a mediator variable.
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relationship between labor force participation and fertility. Further, as long as women are
mainly concerned with child rearing, there is a direct interdependence between fertility
and female labor force participation obscuring empirical ndings. For developed countries
Engelhardt et al. (2004) nd impacts running in both directions. For developing or low in-
come countries the relationship may depend upon the sector that is dominant in employing
women. While employed in a modern sector, women may nd it impossible to rear chil-
dren. However, while employed in (self-sustaining) agriculture the rearing and supervision
of children may not be as problematic.
More modern economic structures may also be approximated by female labor force
participation and related to fertility as a determinant. Another way to measure modern
structures, relating to either socioeconomic or di¤usionist theoretical backing, or both, is
to use urbanization as a proxy variable3. Historically western economies urbanized in a
wave of structural transformation from agrarian to industrialized economies. A phenom-
enon that clearly impacted on reproductive behavior via both socioeconomic and ideational
change. The change in economic opportunities that came along with industrialization is at
the core of unied growth models4 that explain a decline in birth rates (as a consequence
of the changing structures in the economy and society) which eventually shifted resources
towards the growth take-o¤ that followed. In most models the emphasis is on technology,
brought about by industrialization, that lead to an increase in the demand for education.
This, by increasing the returns to education, induced parents to invest in their o¤springs
schooling. However, due to the quantity-quality trade-o¤, a lower fertility rate was the
result. The empirical assessment of the role of modernization in determining demographic
outcomes has, as indicated, often taken the form of looking at urbanization. Urbaniza-
3The demographic literaturesreasoning to assess urbanizations impact on fertility is that it represents
the spread of modern social norms.
4See for a seminal review Galor (2005).
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tion, by reecting both, modern norms and economic opportunities, has historically been
an accompanying phenomenon of industrialization. And as industrialization has preceded
the demographic transition in western economies (Clark and Cummins 2009), urbanization
may serve as an approximation of modern aspects of an economy. Amarante (2014) has
found that the share of rural population, which is the inverse of urbanization, is signi-
cantly positively related to fertility, or, in an instrumental approach, positively, but not
signicantly associated with fertility in a sample of Latin American countries. Similarly,
Beine et al. (2013) nd mostly signicant negative e¤ects of urbanization on fertility, how-
ever they also lose some signicance once an instrumental approach is adopted or when the
sample is constraint to developing countries. Throughout negative and signicant e¤ects
of a control for urbanization are presented in Berrebi and Ostwald (2015), however the
sample always contains the full set of countries in the world. Canning et al. (2013) present
both possible e¤ects of an urban indicator. Negative, at the individual level and positive
at the country level. It appears that urbanization does not necessarily present a negative
impact on fertility (Kalemli-Öczan 2012), nevertheless, if the sample is large enough and
comprising of a (heterogeneous) world sample, a negative signicant relationship becomes
visible.
1.2 Fertility and trade
A very recent, and thus still small, theoretical literature proposes that there may well be an
impact of globalization on fertility outcomes (Galor and Mountford 2008, Do et al. 2014,
Rees and Riezman 2012) or fertility related outcomes (Sauré and Zoabi 2014).
Galor and Mountford (2008) present a formal theory of the e¤ects of international
integration on fertility outcomes across both, developed and developing countries. A dif-
ferential e¤ect between these country groups arises from a di¤erence in the composition of
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trade of these countries. While the industrialized group of countries trades more in mod-
ern products, the developing economies trade more in traditional products. Comparative
advantages will make both groups better o¤ by trading and generate benets. However,
these two broad categories of tradables di¤er distinctly in their demand for skills (and thus
human capital) in their production. While traditional products are more associated with
the use of lower skilled labor, modern products require a higher degree of skills. Trade
will therefore induce more demand of physical (lower skilled) labor in the countries that
trade these products, while the opposite holds true for the group that trades in modern
sectors. That is, the latter group is assumed to show more demand for skilled labor due to
requirements of modern productsproduction processes. At this point the quality-quantity
trade-o¤ (Becker 1960, 1992) is introduced. Given the opportunities on the labor market,
parents face the decision to either have more children that are less educated or fewer, but
better educated ones. Since the demand for skills is not given equally across countries, there
is a bigger incentive for parents to reduce the number of children only in those countries
that show a greater demand for human capital. So essentially trading may a¤ect the deci-
sions to have children through the potential earnings channel of children which opens up
through demand in human capital or educated workers. While this is most prominent ex-
position of a relationship between trade and fertility (and ultimately income) the idea also
appears in Do et al. (2014) and Rees and Riezmann (2012). It leaves testable implications
for determinants of fertility, namely the inuence of trade ows. Indeed there do exist em-
pirical expositions for the proposed relationship. Galor and Mountford (2008) themselves
present evidence in support for the theoretically developed mechanism. A cross-country
sample of 132 countries is used to regress trade openness upon fertility (and control for
infant mortality and GDP). The factor content of trade (low vs high skilled) is implicitly
introduced through a sample split according to OECD membership. OECD members are
thus assumed to have a higher skill component in their trade than nonOECD members.
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The ve year sample between 1985 and 1990 indicates that the e¤ect of trade on fertility
is negative in OECD countries, while the opposite holds true for non-OECD countries. In
the specication an important determinant, mortality (Doepke 2005, Angeles 2010), is con-
trolled for. However, uncontrolled for, and important according to, among others, Becker
et al. (2010), is the level of female education. It is considered particularly important as it
not only approximates foregone income, but also the ability to oversee reproduction-related
health outcomes. The latter is especially important in the context of developing economies
(Osili and Long 2008, Duo et al. 2014). Further, female labor force participation has also
been identied in the empirical fertility literature as an important determinant (Bloom et
al. 2009). Thus, to identify robust e¤ects of the trade mechanism, it is also necessary to
control for the impact of female labor force participation on fertility in the estimation.
Similar to Galor and Mountford (2008), Do et al. (2014) present a formal mechanism
between fertility outcomes and global integration. And the empirical extension uses far
more detailed trade data to support the theoretically developed channel. However, the
robustness towards the established determinants of fertility is yet to be conrmed. More
directly speaking the role of infant mortality (Lorentzen et al. 2008, Angeles 2010) is
not comprehensively accounted for, while the same is true for education (identied in e.g.
Becker et al. 2010). As the empirical acceptance of the theoretically proposed channels
hinges on the degree to which its relevance is tested within already existing knowledge,
a comprehensive empirical specication accounting for existing determinants and newly
proposed ones is necessary.
Chapter 2 of this thesis contributes to ll this gap in the literature and relates empir-
ically trade patterns to population development. It is entitled Trade and Fertility in the
Developing World: The E¤ects of Trade and Trade Structure and based on the identically
entitled paper written jointly with Thomas Gries and published in 2014 in the Journal of
Population Economics. Prior to publication it has been presented to the research com-
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munity on several occasions. The chapter focusses on the role of international (trade)
integration in determining fertility rates across the world and builds mostly upon the theo-
retical advances by Galor and Mountford (2008). It builds upon the theoretically developed
idea that trade di¤erentials, which are related to the human capital content of trade, im-
pact on fertility rates. These theoretical advances are incorporated into a fully developed
cross-country empirical estimation of fertility levels. Building on relatively detailed trade
data, the chapter presents evidence that, along other (well established) determinants, dif-
ferences in the human capital content of trade also impact on the local country-average
fertility level. In more detail that is manufacturing exports are found to correlate nega-
tively with fertility levels while the opposite holds true for primary exports. In other words,
the more skill-intensive exports take place the more likely it is that fertility levels react to
this negatively due to a presumed increase in demand for higher education. At the same
time the analysis reveals in a more in depth analysis, that these e¤ects vary across country
groups and that the e¤ects are comparatively small in relation to other determinants of
fertility levels.
There are several contributions to the literature. The main contribution to the litera-
ture is that the theoretically developed linkages are empirically supported. By doing so,
the empirical analysis expands and deepens existing knowledge. First, it challenges the
hypothesis to hold within richer specied empirical fertility models. That is, acknowledged
fertility determinants such as education (e.g. Azarnert 2008) or female labor force par-
ticipation (e.g. Bloom et al. 2009 or Mishra and Smith 2010) are introduced into the
specications alongside the trade variables that are tested. Second, by looking at di¤erent
country groups, it is possible to expand the empirical knowledge and suggest the theo-
retically hypothesized channel to vary in intensity. More precisely, it is found that the
least developed countries do not face the same e¤ects as more advanced countries. While
the proposed negative impact holds within the complete sample, a split according to de-
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velopment levels reveals that least developed countries do not show the negative impact
of manufacturing exports on fertility levels. Presumably - as suggested in the chapter -
because the impact may simply not be measurable. Third, the contribution also expands
the analysis from an econometric point of view. In a panel setting it is possible to account
for a source of unobserved heterogeneity that may lead to an omitted variable bias. In the
empirical fertility literature culture or religion are frequently named factors that are often
not measured and accounted for. The panel set up in the chapter enables to control for
this source of unobserved heterogeneity. And lastly, the use of an instrumental estimator
is further strengthening the estimation results.
1.3 Fertility and modernization
Modernization, in a broader sense both, economic- and norms and values-wise, has, as the
previous section also suggest, been crucial for and interrelated to fertility development.
A traditional measure for modernization has long been the degree of urbanization.5 The
justication of this procedure rests to a large degree on the historical urbanization pat-
terns of todays industrialized countries. That is, modern economic structures increased
the degree of urbanization heavily. E.g. in England the spread of larger factories and the
adoption of new production technologies (most prominently, for example, steam engines)
during the 1850s were followed by a substantial increase in the concentration of people
living at the same place. This trend towards densely populated areas was subsequently
further manifested. While the labor force in manufacturing doubled in England between
1850 and 1880, the urban population also doubled during the same period (Kim 2005).
And because industrialization has preceded the demographic transition (Clark and
5Even further, the correlation between urbanization and income has been perceived that strong that
urbanization has sometimes been used as an approximation for the level of development (Jedwab and
Vollrath 2015).
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Cummins 2009), modernization in the form of urbanization is regarded as an impacting
driver of reproductive behavior. However, the impact may occur through both, socioe-
conomic and ideational change. An important aspect of socioeconomic change alongside
industrialization is the change in job opportunities. With a change in production technolo-
gies and a concentration and centralization of production, urbanization goes along with
the demand of better educated workers. Again, the quality-quantity trade-o¤may become
apparent as parents restrict their number of o¤spring in order to enable them (the chil-
dren) to benet from better paying jobs (that require a certain degree of education) in the
industrializing economy. Similarly, as emphasized in ideational change point of views, ur-
banization also enables the e¤ective spread of modern social norms regarding reproductive
behavior.
The use of urbanization as an indicator for modern structures has been a leading ap-
proach in cross-country empirical growth models (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2002, 2005, Dittmar
2011) and, due to the aforementioned channels, also found its way to empirical studies seek-
ing to explain fertility behavior. However, as noted in Kalemli-Özcan (2012), urbanization
has not proven to be a consistent predictor in determining fertility levels. Amarante (2014)
has used its inverse (the share of rural population) and nds a positive impact, signicant,
however, only when it is not instrumented for. The results are valid for Latin American
countries, which also represent a rather homogeneous group. In Beine et al. (2013) the
signicant negative e¤ect of urbanization is only maintained as long as the sample is not
constraint to developing countries. Further, the notion that the e¤ect of urbanization on
fertility rests to a degree on the sample selected is supported by Berrebi and Oswald (2015)
where signicant negative e¤ects of an urbanization control are maintained in a world sam-
ple. Another recent study reports similar mixed results for an urbanization control variable
in the estimation of country-wide fertility levels. A sample of developing countries shows
both negative and positive correlations in Canning et al. (2013). A possible explanation
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are di¤erent restrictions on the set of countries.
Even though the idea that modernization brings about a change in reproductive behav-
ior persists, the empirical implementation of urbanization as its indicator has led to mixed
results as indicated above. A reconciliation may be, however, a recently proposed rened
view about the causes of urbanization especially in the context of developing countries.6
The proposition has profound implications for urbanizations interpretation as a modern-
ization proxy in developing countries. It is those countries, however, that, as presented in
the introduction, would gain most from understanding the mechanisms of fertility decline.
Therefore, the connection of the recent notion of underlying causes of urbanization with
fertility in this country group appears sensible.
Gollin et al. (2014) show that urbanization does not necessarily follow from a concen-
tration of productive facilities. It may also be an outcome of unevenly distributed rents
contrary to (more) evenly distributed payments for labors productivity. Both scenarios
imply stark, opposing implications for reproductive behavior. While "productive cities",
which is the coined term for urbanization with roots in growing productive and labor inten-
sive capacity, may generate the mechanism that leads to an on average decline in fertility,
"consumption cities", where income opportunities are kept highly unequal, may not gen-
erate the mechanisms that drives down fertility. At the same time both situations may be
described with an equal degree of urbanization.
Chapter 3, entitled Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Develop-
ing Countries, brings together cross-country fertility estimation with this recently proposed
aspect of urbanization in developing countries and lls the literature gap by introducing
the rened view into the modernization and fertility relationship. It is also based on joint
work with Thomas Gries and has been published under the same title in the Journal of
6The notion of urbanization without growth during the end of the 20th century in develping countries
(and especially in Africa) has earlier also been described in Fay and Opal (2000).
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International Development in 2015. While chapter two focusses on a very specic, though
theoretically well developed channel, this chapter focusses on the general relation between
modernization and fertility in developing countries. Even more, it introduces the cur-
rently developed view of urbanization as a modernization proxy in developing countries
into cross-country fertility analysis.
In chapter three, a distinction is made to account for this di¤ering notion urbanizations
quality on the background of Gollin et al. (2014)s ndings. Gollin et al. (2014) argue
that urbanization may be the outcome of two di¤erent processes. Either labor ows from
agriculture to the industrial sector, i.e. "production cities" arise, or rents from e.g. resource
extraction demand urban services and lead to "consumption cities". With regard to the
mechanisms of fertility decline the incentive structure to reduce fertility may look di¤erently
in both types - consumption cities vs production cities - of economic structures.
It contributes to the literature in several respects. First, it is a comprehensive empirical
cross-sectional country study of aggregate fertility behavior in developing countries with a
focus on modernization. However, it not only allows for socioeconomic (demand) theory on
fertility change, but also ideational change ideas that are advocated by many demographers.
A basic idea of ideational change models is that modern social norms di¤use most in
agglomerations where people are living in greater density. An ideational change towards
low fertility norms may therefore be detected. Moreover, there need to be supportive
structures for these ideas to spread. The latter may well depend - as the chapter argues - on
the agglomerations characteristics. Second, it incorporates recent ndings in development
research on the causes of urbanization into population research. And third, it introduces
interaction modelling in xed-e¤ects panel estimations to trade-o¤ sample availability and
informational content. The empirical analysis reveals that urbanization may indeed be of a
di¤erent quality with regard to its capacity to induce fertility decline. While urbanization
that is characterized by higher slum incidence, presumably the type neither supplying
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enough higher paying manufacturing jobs nor having the supportive structure for ideational
change, does not lower fertility, the opposite is true for better qualityurbanization, i.e.
of the type with lower slum incidence.
1.4 Modern sector development with trade and institutions
In socioeconomic models the mechanisms that lead to changes in fertility are closely con-
nected with economic modernization and industrialization as will be presented in chapters
two and three. Further, not only the connection is well accepted but it also seems that
modernization has a profound impact on fertility. Naturally this implies that once coun-
tries change their economic structure and industrialize, people will be employed in jobs
with a higher productivity and benet from income gains. This process may trigger a
change in reproductive behavior and channel resources to educate fewer children better. A
reinforcing positive loop may occur. If this process of declining fertility may be triggered
by a modern sector expansion, the question is how? What is necessary for the industrial
sector, the modern sector in developing countries to develop?
A look at the literature conrms that the importance of a modern sector for countries
to develop has widely been acknowledged. This includes empirical contributions (e.g. Szir-
mai 2012, De Vries et al. 2012, Peneder 2003) but as well analytical ones (e.g. Duarte
and Restuccia 2010 or Dekle and Vandenbrouke 2012). Szirmai (2012) analyses the im-
portance of manufacturing growth for overall development in a long time-series sample of
developing and developed countries. The ndings indicate that industrialization has played
an enormously important role in recent growth stories up to the present and supports the
engine of growth hypothesis for the industrial sector. Similarly, De Vries et al. (2012) nd
benecial aggregate growth e¤ects of sectoral shifts for the BRICs, however with the re-
striction that a distinction between formal and informal activities within sectors has to be
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made. That is, the positive e¤ect is found when resources (i.e. labor) are shifted towards
formal activities that are associated with higher productivity. By focussing on developed
countries Peneder (2003) nds in panel estimations a positive e¤ect of structural variables
on aggregate growth in the 1990s. Even though he does not explicitly link the modern
sector to aggregate growth, Rodrik (2013) also underlines its importance. In a study of
convergence it is found that labor productivity in the industry sector does converge in a
cross-section sample of countries from the complete range of incomes.
A next set of related literature describes the characteristics of the industrial sector.
Typically - and regarded as central in the production process - the modern manufacturing
sector enables the accumulation of capital (Szirmai 2012). Especially during the initial
stages of development the possibility to accumulate capital within the dominating primary
sector is scarce. The higher (average) capital intensity in industry therefore allows for
this shortcoming of the agricultural sector to be ameliorated. Possibly connected to the
aforementioned accumulation of capital is another characteristic of the modern sector. It
is generally assumed to be possible to generate higher productivity increases than the
traditional sector. This e¤ect has been coined as the structural change bonus (e.g. Rodrik
2009). Further characteristics include opportunities of economies of scale and linkage and
spillover e¤ects (Szirmai 2012). Especially the latter are frequently assumed to present
positive externalities of investments in knowledge and technology that occur both within
and across sectors.
The importance of linkages and spillovers is also presented in the literature that con-
nects modern sector trade with (overall-) growth. Herzer et al. (2006) argue that knowledge
spillovers and di¤usion within the sector will take place when companies start to engage
in trade and export their products to the international market. Similarly, it is found that
when modern sector companies start to compete internationally and export, their produc-
tivity may increase (Van Biesebroek 2005). In his study Van Biesebroek (2005) nds that
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higher productivity exists in companies that export. While this can still be explained with
self-selection, the subsequent nding that productivity increases after exporting has com-
menced, is evidence that exporting is benecial for productivity enhancement (e.g. also
in Melitz 2003 or Dogan et al. 2011). Besides supporting the sectors own development,
exporting manufacturing products also alleviates price instabilities resulting from primary
products (Hesse 2008). Primary products prices uctuate a lot more than secondary
productsprices at the global scale. Based on the modern sectors characteristic of special
capital needs, or - put more positively - special investment opportunities, it is also sensible
to look at the literature that posits institutions to be of major importance for that sectors
development. Acemoglu et al. (2001) focus on the risk of expropriation, which, as part of
the institution of property rights enforcement, may be important for development. Empir-
ically this has also found some support in the rm-level literature. Johnson et al. (2002)
nd that weak property rights weaken the investment environment and lead companies to
not invest into their businesses.
While the necessity for developing countries to develop a modern sector has been widely
acknowledged, and several aspects, such as trading and sound institutions, have been widely
discussed in the general growth context, their introduction as direct determinants of modern
sector development has not yet been studied.
In chapter four, Crucial for Modern Sector Development? The Role of Exports and
Institutions in Developing Countries, this lack of evidence is picked up. The chapter is
also related to the theme of modernization in developing countries, similar to the previous
ones. It has been presented to the research community on several occasions and is based
on a jointly written paper with Thomas Gries. While chapters two and three empirically
connect the degree of modernization as a determinant of fertility levels, chapter four shall
focus on the drivers of modernization itself, or, operationally dened, on the emergence of
a modern (industrial) sector. What are the specic drivers for modern sector development?
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Based on the nding that a formal industrial sector exhibits benets for further general
development the chapter empirically explores its potential determinants. The necessary
theoretical underpinning is taken from the general and broad economic development lit-
erature that argues for the relative importance of di¤erent determinants. A rst major
focus is placed on trade, and especially manufacturing exports. Manufacturing exports are
positively associated with a countrys overall development for predominantly two reasons.
First they take volatility from a primary products trading economy and second they in-
duces productivity gains and spillover-e¤ects within the sector. Another focus is placed
on institutional development. Also from the broader growth literature (e.g. Acemoglu
et al. 2005, Rodrik 2002) it can be derived that especially having secure property rights
has potentially large impacts on capital accumulating behavior and investments within the
sector. Other discussed aspects such as the role of natural resources or aid are also picked
up in the empirical analysis of developing countries.
The chapter contributes to and enhances the literature in three ways. First, it estab-
lishes that the two well discussed factors of per capita growth are key determinants of
modern (manufacturing) sector development in developing countries. In a cross-country
sample of over 70 countries and a lengthy time span of over 30 years not only the recently
introduced cross-country convergence (Rodrik 2013) is supported but also extended with
knowledge about key drivers. Second, it uses an up-to-date empirical estimation strategy
to control for possible endogeneity in a dynamic panel setting. The major results of a
positive impact of exports on the manufacturing sector and the driving role of sound in-
stitutions on that sector hold across various specications and estimation strategies. And
third, it derives more nuanced results across the large sample of 75 developing economies
according to their development level. Especially for exports there appears to exist a non-
linearity within the level of development of the countries in the sample. A simple division
according to the World Banks income categories reveals that exporting does support the
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manufacturing sectors development only for the richer two country groups according to
the World Bank classication.
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Chapter 2
Trade and Fertility in the Developing World: The
Impact of Trade and Trade Structure
This chapter is based on joint work with Thomas Gries and published with slight di¤erences
in the Journal of Population Economics (2014), 27(4):1165-1186.
2.1 Introduction
Both trade and fertility are important issues in the development economics debate. How
does international trade a¤ect a countrys development? What are the causes and e¤ects
of fertility in the development process? An important recent contribution by Galor and
Mountford (2008, 2006) proposes that these two factors, trade and population develop-
ment, are interrelated. The authors suggest that international trade between developed
and developing countries asymmetrically a¤ects the demand for human capital in these
countries. High trade-induced human capital demand in developed countries contributes
to a decrease in fertility rates while the opposite, i.e., a lack of human capital demand,
leads to an increase in fertility rates in developing countries. In the tradition of unied
growth theory (e.g., Galor et al., 2009, Galor and Weil 2000, McDermott 2002, Doepke
2004 or Galor 2011) they analyze both developing and developed countries and argue that
world trade intensication asymmetrically a¤ects the pace of demographic transition across
countries. Naturally, demographic transition is characterized by an initial decline in mor-
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tality rates followed by a corresponding decline in fertility rates.1 However, as its onset and
evolvement is neither a simultaneous nor uniform process and its implications for income
distributions are great, understanding it is vital. Accordingly, especially in the light of
ongoing vast trade intensication (WTO 2006, 2011) over the past decades it appears to
be an important theory that connects trade and demographic development and contributes
to an understanding of the immense di¤erences in per-capita incomes across countries.
In a stylized two-economy model Galor and Mountford (2008) propose a mechanism
that explains the current distribution of the world population and the "Great Divergence"
in income per capita across countries. While the controversy about the divergence in income
levels and its explanations2 include di¤erences in institutions, geographic locations, human
capital formation, and colonialism, their proposition rests on the role of international trade
and increasing globalization patterns.3 In brief, they propose that international trade af-
fects economies di¤erently due to their di¤erent trade composition. While in industrialized
economies the gains from trade will be directed towards investment in human capital forma-
tion, in developing economies they will be directed towards population growth. Specically,
they assume di¤erent levels of technology within an agrarian and a manufacturing sector.
These sectors di¤er in relevance and size in industrialized and developing economies. While
industrialized economies rely on strong technology-intensive sectors, developing countries
rely on the opposite, which are less skill- but more labor-intensive sectors. Resting on the
presumptions of comparative advantage, international trade deepens developed countries
1For a detailed account of the demographic transition, theory, and trends see recently e.g., Galor (2012),
or earlier, Bloom et al. (2003) or Lee (2003). See Strulik and Vollmer (2013) for an evolutinary account of
cross-country fertility dispersion.
2Galor and Mountford (2008) provide a brief overview of the most important papers in the respective
areas.
3Other theoretical contributions that connect world trade with fertility decisions are Lehmijoki and
Palokangas (2009) and Sauré and Zoaby (2011). While the former focus on wage and income e¤ects
induced by international trade, the latter concentrate on the development of female labor force participation
in connection with international trade and the resulting fertility and growth e¤ects.
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specialization in skill-intensive, industrial and technologically advanced goods, while coun-
tries that focus on less skill-intensive and more labor-intensive goods specialize in those
sectors. The result is that gains from trade are channeled into the demand for human
capital in developed economies, while in developing economies the demand for unskilled
labor could rise. This leads to a gradual investment in the quality of the labor force in
the former group of countries, while the latter group may invest more in increasing the
size of the labor force. Now from a households point of view, this means that in an
industrialized, skill-intensive economy there is an incentive to have smaller families and
provide ones children with better education. Parents optimize their own consumption
and the potential income of their o¤spring. Naturally, skilled workers have greater income
potential. Assuming that it is more resource-intensive for parents to raise skilled than
unskilled o¤spring, they decide on the number of children and the amount of time they
want to devote to raising them. This is essentially a decision on whether to raise skilled
or unskilled children. As raising skilled children requires more time and money, they will
restrict themselves to having fewer children. However, if there is demand for human capital
these children later have a greater potential income (a signicant return on human capital)
which is an incentive for parents to invest in their childrens education. From the macro
perspective this is an aspect of demographic transition, namely a decline in fertility rates.
According to theory, in an economy with intensive use of unskilled labor this driver of
demographic transition is absent, which leads rst to a divergence in countries fertility
levels and eventually to a divergence of per capita income levels. All in all, we learn from
the model that the structure of the export sector is signicant in determining the impact
of international trade on fertility (and income). If the theory holds, one could ask whether
the development of advanced economies adversely a¤ects the development of less-developed
countries (Galor and Mountford 2008), the answer to which contributes a more nuanced
aspect to the debate on whether trade encourages income growth.
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Galor and Mountford (2008) also provide empirical evidence for the proposed relation-
ship. In a conventional cross-country sample of 132 countries fertility is regressed upon
trade openness, while in another sample of 97 countries the average years of schooling are
regressed on openness. The chosen period is 1985 to 1990. Since theory requires a division
of the sample according to the factor content of trade (human capital intensive vs. unskilled
labor intensive) the sample is split into OECD and non-OECD countries, assuming that
the former export on average more human capital intensive goods. The results support the
hypothesis. The trade share in GDP a¤ects the average fertility rate negatively in OECD
countries, i.e., countries with an assumed high share of human capital-intensive goods in
their exports. The opposite holds true for non-OECD countries. The authors also nd a
negative e¤ect of the trade share on education in non-OECD countries but a positive e¤ect
in OECD countries. Finally, the results are strengthened by the use of the Frankel-Romer
instrumentation (Frankel and Romer 1999) for trade share in GDP.
While the empirical section nicely underlines the broad mechanism developed in the the-
ory, the specication leaves room for a more in-depth analysis. The main point is whether
the proposition holds in richer specied empirical fertility models. By incorporating ad-
ditional regressors and employing opulent specications we strengthen the link between
the theory and this strand of population literature and make the proposition comparable
with existing fertility estimations. For instance, the inclusion of education as a determi-
nant of fertility is particularly important (e.g., Becker et al. 2010 or Azarnert 2008), as is
accounting for the relationship between fertility and female labor force participation (e.g.,
Bloom et al. 2009, Galor and Weil 1996 or Mishra and Smyth 2010). Further, we expand
the empirical knowledge by dividing the panel into subpanels of di¤erent income levels.
This enables us to provide more evidence for the interaction channel that possibly varies
in intensity. From an econometric point of view we also expand the analysis along the
following lines. First, instead of relying on one trade indicator (trade share in GDP) and
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to di¤erentiate between factor contents by splitting the sample in OECD vs. non-OECD,
we use two trade indicators in two sectors. Our assumption is that on average, the hu-
man capital content in manufactures is higher than in primary exports.4 Also, we use this
trade indicator in per capita terms in order to relate it more directly to fertility decisions.
Second, and in line with the literature, we assume fertility decisions to be a¤ected also
by factors such as culture or religion. Thus, to control for such unobserved heterogeneity
at the country level we expand the analysis to include a panel setting. Third, the use of
a system GMM estimator enables us to account for potential endogeneity problems that
are inherent in many conventional (cross-country) regressions. The use of the estimator is
especially important as fertility regressions are well-known for complicated cause and e¤ect
situations, as noted by Schultz (2007), for example.
We are primarily interested in exploring whether international trade impacts on fertility
decisions across countries. The implications of a positive nding would be a long-run change
in a countrys comparative advantages, population development, and also growth patterns
as predicted by GM. However, as we do not directly test the relationship between trade
and growth we do not elaborate on this vast literature.5
Our empirical ndings generally support the theory. They show that (i) international
trade a¤ects fertility signicantly, especially in less developed countries, and (ii) the type
of exports (i.e., their skill intensity) is particularly important for the direction of impact on
fertility. In our analysis we nd evidence that while manufacturing exports a¤ect fertility
negatively, primary exports a¤ect fertility positively.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We introduce our data and
4As Galor and Mountford (2008) note, there is little authoritative data on the factor content of trade.
Even though there may be sections of the manufacturing sector that operate with very little human capital
intensity and parts of the primary sector that operate with a high degree of human capital, we would expect
our results to be further strengthened if we had more di¤erentiated data.
5A good literature overview and a critical account of related problematic issues can be found in, e.g.,
Winters (2004).
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methodology in detail in the next section and continue with the estimation results. The
last section summarizes our major ndings and concludes the paper.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
The goal of this section is to determine the e¤ects of di¤erent export sectors on fertility.
Based on the theoretical model we expect high-skill industrial high-industrial exports to
impact di¤erently on fertility than low-skill industrial low-industrial or primary exports.
Our estimation strategy involves using a panel, today a common practice in cross-country
empirical estimations. Further, we divide our sample into sub-samples and use di¤erent
estimators for a robustness analysis. The main part of our analysis circles around a panel
estimation with the GMM systems estimator which has several advantages but so far has
not frequently been applied to fertility estimations.
We propose a straightforward panel regression model in which we regress a fertility
proxy on trade measures with a capable GMM estimator. Because the estimator needs
to be used with caution (Roodman 2009) we provide more details on its application and
strength below. In the estimation we control for other potential impacts on fertility as
drawn from the existing fertility literature. Using ve databases (World Development
Indicators, Comtrade, Child Mortality Database, Penn World Tables, and Barro and Lees
dataset on educational attainment), we create a panel of around 100 countries (N) and 38
years (T) between 1970 and 2007. We limit our complete sample to this time frame and
country choice, since for many countries there is not enough data for the period before
1970 to create a reliable dataset. Depending on the specication we alter the panel and, as
in our main analysis, create a balanced panel of ve 5-year averages. However, we provide
precise information about the number of countries and observations for each individual
estimation in the tables, and indicate a sample change to yearly data in the robustness
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analysis section.
2.2.1 Model and Methodology
The balanced panel that is analyzed in the main section consists of 68 countries and includes
ve non-overlapping 5-year periods from 1980 to 2005. The limitation in observations
stems from data availability. In the robustness section we allow for unbalanced panels and
estimate with more observations. According to our goal of estimating the e¤ect of export
sectors on fertility we estimate the model:
Fit = + Tit + Xit + t + i + "it (2.1)
where the subscripts i and t denote country and time. F is our measure of fertility, T
are two trade variables of interest, andX is a set of control variables. We include both time-
and country-specic unobserved e¤ects,  and . For the time e¤ect we allow for a linear
trend to pick up on the general trend of declining fertility and to retrieve results relative to
this trend.  is a common intercept and " is an i.i.d. error term. The inclusion of a country-
specic e¤ect guarantees that country-specic time-invariant characteristics are modeled
properly. In the context of fertility this seems relevant as, for example, cultural di¤erences
may a¤ect fertility rates. However, the inclusion of  produces estimation problems for
the conventional OLS cross-section estimator. For consistency the country-specic e¤ects
would have to be orthogonal to other regressors (Caselli et al. 1996). We cannot rule
this out from a theoretical perspective. Consistent estimators thus start by eliminating
the country-specic term by either taking deviations from period averages (xed-e¤ects
estimator) or by using period averages right away (between estimator) (DeJong and Ripoll
2006). This strategy deals successfully with estimation inconsistencies resulting from non-
orthogonality between regressors and country-specic e¤ects but, as Caselli et al. (1996)
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note, inconsistencies remain unless all regressors are strictly exogenous. In our case this
is especially important to note as some of our control variables (e.g., female labor force
participation) are a potential source of this endogeneity bias.
To cope with both problems we use the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM estimator is similar
to the di¤erence GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Both estimators
use a di¤erenced version
Fit Fi(t 1) = (Tit Ti(t 1))+(Xit Xi(t 1))+(t (t 1))+(i i)+("it "i(t 1)) (2.2)
of equation (2.1) to eliminate the country-xed e¤ect i. Endogeneity concerns are
countered with within-instruments, i.e. the use of lagged level data as instruments in the
di¤erenced equation (equation (2.2)) (the di¤erence estimator) or the use of rst di¤erences
as instruments in the level equation (equation (2.1)), which is part of the system estimator.
In the presentation of our main results we focus on the system GMM estimator6 since the
di¤erence estimator is said to have shortcomings. Easterly and Levine (2001) specically
note that the lagged levels of persistent regressors may prove to be weak instruments that
could bias the estimation. Also, the use of di¤erences alone leaves information about the
level relationship unused (DeJong and Ripoll 2006) and further reduces the time dimension
of the sample.
Even though the GMM system estimator appears to control for many caveats in panel
data estimation, it rests on critical assumptions. Therefore we follow Roodman (2006) and
6Estimations with the di¤erence estimator do not qualitatively alter our key ndings.
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report among regression coe¢ cients and sample-size important test statistics to validate
the identifying assumptions. The rst is the Hansen-J test for over-identication (Hansen
1982). The null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity should not be rejected. The Hansen-J
test may be weakened by instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009), thus we limit the
number of instruments and report their count. Further, we report the m1  and m2 
tests for autocorrelation in the di¤erenced errors ("it   "i(t 1)) after Arellano and Bond
(1991). The presence of second-order serial correlation may mean that some lags are invalid
instruments. Therefore we should not reject the null of no serial correlation in the m2 
test. To deal with heteroscedasticity and arbitrary correlation patterns within countries
we use the two-step estimator and the nite-sample Windmeijer correction.
To obtain generally valid results we run several specications with di¤ering sets of
control variables, ensuring that we proceed in accordance with the fertility literature. A
core proposition of the theory by Galor and Mountford is the di¤erential e¤ect of trade on
fertility. This e¤ect is primarily modeled by using two di¤erent trade variables.
In an extension we make robustness checks and exchange our estimator for an even
more common xed-e¤ects estimator. Even though we cannot control for endogeneity
(but can leave out the most critical variable, female labor force participation) we are
still capable of controlling a bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., the above
mentioned cultural di¤erences across countries). Also, our chosen GLS estimator is capable
of correcting serial correlation problems and group-wise heteroscedasticity.7 However, most
importantly, it performs well in an unbalanced panel so we can return to a yearly panel
with more variation and more countries. The panel dimensions almost double in terms
of the number of countries and increase seven times in terms of t. We estimate the same
model as in equation (2.1). Increasing the sample size also allows us to split the panel
7A test after Greene (2003) indicates heteroscedasticity within groups. Our test for serial correlation
(after Wooldridge 2002) also rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
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and estimate the model in di¤erent income groups without reducing the sub-samples to
a small number of observations. This will provide an impression of how well-behaved the
proposition of impact is across income groups.8
2.2.2 Data and variables
Dependent Variable
We estimate fertility with the total fertility rate (TFR). The TFR is a composite measure
containing all age-specic fertility rates. Therefore, it comprises the number of children a
imaginary woman would give birth to if she were to move fast-forward through her life (and
her childbearing years). The great advantage of this is that the TFR is not inuenced by age
composition. The indicator is taken from the World Banks development indicators (WDI)
and lets us focus directly on reproductive behavior. Since the theory states that trade
impacts on fertility levels, we use this indicator in levels. For a more detailed description
and potential drawbacks of the TFR see, e.g., Weil (2005).
Independent variable
Trade variables are a) manufacturing exports per capita and b) primary exports per capita.
Using exports per capita seem more appropriate than using trade shares or a structure-
indicating ratio, since exports per capita cover potential e¤ects for an average person
and hence point more directly towards the fertility decision of an household. We include
both variables in one regression to identify an di¤erential e¤ect.9 Primary exports per
capita refers to the value of exports (to the world) in categories 0-4 according to standard
8We follow the World Banks income groups classication: High-income countries, Upper middle-income
countries, Lower middle-income countries, Low-income countries with 2009 GNI per capita of more than
US$12 195, US$3 946-US$12 195, US$996US$3 945 and less than US$996, respectively.
9Tests with separate estimations for both variables do not alter our ndings.
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international trade classications (SITC) divided by population. Manufacturing exports
per capita refers to the values of exports (to the world) in SITC categories 5-8, also divided
by total population. Data on trade statistics is drawn from the trade division of the United
Nations (Comtrade 2011), while data on population gures is drawn from the Penn World
Tables (Heston et al. 2011). The variable is used in levels to approximate the demand
for human capital according to the theory. Exports per capita are stated in current US
dollars.
Control variables
GDP per capita, the rst control variable, is our proxy for income. The role of income as a
determinant of fertility is not straightforward and the subject of an long-standing debate.10
The impact of income on fertility strongly rises and falls depending on whether children are
perceived as a productive asset or a consumption good (Drèze and Murthi 2001). If children
are regarded as a consumption good the focus is on costs and the quality-quantity trade-o¤.
This means that rising income makes children more a¤ordable, hence we have a positive
relationship. At the same time one may observe that when parents income increases,
their opportunity costs rise as well, showing a possible negative e¤ect. Alternatively, if
parents substitute quality for quantity the e¤ect would also be negative. Particularly in
developing countries, children are more likely to be regarded as a productive asset, i.e.,
an inexpensive source of additional labor and old-age security. What may further confuse
the relationship is the type of (additional) income. While wage increases raise opportunity
costs, an increase in productive assets, e.g., land, could raise demand for children (Drèze
and Murthi 2001). Due to these complications we do not expect a particular sign for this
control variable. Our data source is the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009), while
10As early as in 1798 Malthus proposed that income increases above subsistence levels are capable of
spurring population growth (Malthus 1798).
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GDP per capita is used in levels to account for the mentioned possible interactions. It is
stated in constant 2005 US dollars.
We also control for infant mortality as it directly a¤ects fertility decisions.11 To obtain
a desired family size in the presence of rising child mortality, parents are forced to have
more children. We therefore expect a strong positive relationship between infant mortality
and fertility. It is suggested that especially in developing countries, infant mortality may
not be exogenous to fertility. Due to hygiene and health issues high fertility can lead
to higher child mortality (Drèze and Murthi 2001). We will account for this by using
instruments. The data is taken from the CME Info portal, a UN inter-agency group (Unicef,
UN Population Division, World Bank, WHO) that produces child mortality estimates
(CME, 2010). Further, general mortality is also said to inuence fertility decisions (e.g.,
Angeles 2010), however general mortality correlates strongly with child mortality and is
thus not included separately.
We also control for female labor force participation in our analysis. Especially if women
are mainly occupied with child-rearing, their participation in the labor force a¤ects the
number of children they have. However, in less developed agricultural economies family
duties and labor participation may be more easily combined than in middle-income, more
industrialized societies. We therefore do not expect a uniform impact. Further, it is
generally acknowledged that female labor force participation can lead to an endogeneity
problem, as fertility can also be a determinant of labor force participation (Bloom et al.
2009). We use data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2011) that is
stated as the ratio of economically active women to the total number of women aged 15
and older. "Economically active" means that they participate in the production of goods
and services.
11See e.g. Doepke (2005) on the relationship between fertility and child mortality in the Becker-type
quantity-quality model.
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Female education. The role of education is said to have di¤erent e¤ects on fertility.
Higher education can lead to higher income and thus increase the opportunity costs of
having children. It may also be the case that more educated women, especially in developing
countries, leave the agrarian sector and bear fewer children. Female education is also said
to a¤ect a womans ability to have the desired number of children (see, e.g., Kim 2010). We
also control for education since Galor and Mountfords conclusion that trade in industrial
goods induces investments in human capital can be interpreted in two ways. The rst is
the modeled channel of induced investments in ones o¤springs education, while the second
is investment in ones own education. By including female education we control for the
second e¤ect. The level of education is approximated by the average years of schooling,
with data taken from Barro and Lee (2013). The original data is provided in the shape
of 5-year averages. To obtain the yearly time series for the robustness estimations we
interpolate between the values because the series seem to follow strong trends and do not
vary greatly.
Urbanization. In the analysis, urbanization can impact fertility decisions because in
urban settings children are less likely to be seen as a productive asset. Also, children are
more di¢ cult to supervise in urban environments (Drèze and Murthi 2001). Finally, a
rapid spread of modern social norms is attributed to urban settings. We use data from
the World Development Indicators on the share of population living in urban areas (World
Bank 2011). We also interpolate the original 5-year averages to obtain yearly time series
that we use in the robustness section for the same reasons as our education variable.
In the main analysis we use half-decade averages data from 1980 to 2005. Even though
it causes us to lose information, we create this balanced panel as it is preferably used by
our estimator. Summary statistics are given in Table A2.1 for both the main (averaged)
panel and the robustness/extension panel with yearly data from 1970 to 2008. Detailed
information on data and its source is given in the appendix (Table A2.2).
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2.3 Estimation Results
Table 2.1 shows the estimation results for the complete sample of all 68 countries in the
balanced panel. The columns present the estimations of di¤erent model specications.
On the left-hand side we start with less detailed specications and increase the level of
specication (in accordance with existing fertility studies) towards the right. Throughout
all estimations we control for country-specic e¤ects (e.g., religion or culture) and in most
cases also for a linear time trend. The latter is supposed to control for a general trend of
declining fertility and to enable us to make statements about impacting factors relative to
this trend. We are mainly interested in the behavior of the two export sector variables,
manufacturing (Man. Exp. p.c.) and primary (Prim. Exp. p.c.) exports per capita. Look-
ing at the complete sample of all income groups, we nd a negative and signicant impact
of manufacturing exports on fertility, while primary exports per capita exert a positive
signicant impact on fertility. This nding provides empirical evidence for a di¤erential
e¤ect of di¤erent trade sectors on fertility. The hypothesis from Galor and Mountford (and
their theoretical model) is supported. A growing manufacturing export sector seems to
impact on the average household fertility decision. According to the theory, the availabil-
ity of jobs in the manufacturing export sector increases demand for education and in turn,
lowers fertility. Also, looking at the control variables we nd many of the expected signs,
the majority of which are signicant. We see a non-signicant positive impact of income
on fertility. Given the debate, we would have expected it to be at least negative. However,
it may be the case that since the majority of countries are in the developing group, the
theory favoring this direction of impact is supported. As acknowledged in the literature,
child mortality appears to be positively (and throughout, signicantly) related to fertility.
Another strong negative relationship is established for female schooling while female labor
force participation is, as expected, negatively related to fertility, however not signicantly.
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Table 2.1: Trade and Fertility (Main Sample - GMM Estimates)
Dependent: TFR All Countries
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.145*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.095**
(0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.036) (0.040)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.061*** 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.063*
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033)
lnfant Mortality 0.168** 0.145** 0.288*** 0.304***
(0.072) (0.067) (0.080) (0.097)
GDP p.c. 0.101 0.129
(0.121) (0.145)
Fem.Schooling -0.359*** -0.344*** -0.324*** -0.250** -0.248**
(0.131) (0.093) (0.089) (0.100) (0.108)
Fem.Lab.For.Part. -0.011 0.008 -0.014 -0.013 -0.006
(0.196) (0.144) (0.130) (0.150) (0.155)
Urbanization 0.033 0.022
(0.063) (0.074)
Time-trend yes no yes no yes
Observations 338 338 338 337 337
Countries 68 68 68 68 68
Hansen (p-value) 0.72 0.25 0.32 0.15 0.13
Instrument count 10 40 41 43 44
AR(1) (p-value) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) (p-value) 0.40 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.15
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is the total fertility rate (TFR).
All variables are used in natural logarithms. *, ** and *** denote
signicance at the 10-,5- and 1% level, respectively. Windmeijer
corrected S.E.s in parentheses. All models are estimated with a constant.
Sample range is 1980 - 2005 in 5-year averaged non-overlapping periods
In Table 2.2 the two panels at the top and at the bottom divide the complete sample
into high-income (top) and middle- and low-income countries (bottom). Of the initial 68
countries, 33 are in the World Banks income categories 1 (high-income) and 2 (high-income
non-OECD), while the remaining 35 are in categories 3 (upper middle-income), 4 (lower
middle-income) and 5 (low-income).
The two subsamples di¤er slightly in their similarity to the overall results. First, even
though still negative the e¤ect of manufacturing exports on fertility is losing magnitude
44
Table 2.2: Trade and Fertility (High-/Low-Income Samples - GMM Esti-
mates)
Dependent: TFR High-Income Countries (Groups 1 and 2)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.083** -0.076 -0.086 -0.057* -0.061*
(0.035) (0.072) (0.056) (0.030) (0.033)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.095*** 0.098* 0.098** 0.041 0.038
(0.035) (0.053) (0.041) (0.033) (0.026)
Infant Mortality -0.017 0.001 0.291** 0.264**
(0.143) (0.165) (0.121) (0.129)
GDP p.c. 0.321* 0.372**
(0.175) (0.162)
Fem.Schooling -0.509 -0.895** -0.415 -0.208 -0.082
(0.333) (0.410) (0.439) (0.520) (0.573)
Fem.Lab.For.Part. -0.024 -0.052 -0.120 0.010 -0.085
(0.232) (0.221) (0.265) (0.257) (0.295)
Urbanization 0.123 0.092
(0.085) (0.122)
Time-trend yes no yes no yes
Observations 164 164 164 163 163
Countries 33 33 33 33 33
Hansen (p-value) 0.23 0.44 0.12 0.22 0.17
Instrument count 22 24 25 30 30
AR(1) (p-value) 0.18 0.47 0.28 0.03 0.03
AR(2) (p-value) 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.12 0.14
Dependent: TFR Lower-Income Countries (Groups 3,4 and 5)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.066** -0.059** -0.046* 0.013 0.034
(0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.036) (0.036)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.039 0.113*** 0.074** 0.178*** 0.135***
(0.033) (0.039) (0.031) (0.038) (0.038)
Infant Mortality 0.445*** 0.367*** 0.496*** 0.310**
(0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.121)
GDP p.c. -0.266** -0.427***
(0.135) (0.162)
Fem.Schooling -0.317*** -0.053 0.025 -0.014 -0.105
(0.103) (0.173) (0.168) (0.227) (0.166)
Fem.Lab.For.Part. -0.188 -0.269** 0.017 -0.160 0.013
(0.148) (0.127) (0.220) (0.125) (0.149)
Urbanization 0.005 0.174
(0.130) (0.115)
Time-trend yes no yes no yes
Observations 174 174 174 174 174
Countries 35 35 35 35 35
Hansen (p-value) 0.31 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.50
Instrument count 16 18 17 25 25
AR(1) (p-value) 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01
AR(2) (p-value) 0.45 0.47 0.92 0.82 0.52
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is the total fertility rate (TFR).
All variables are used in natural logarithms. *, ** and *** denote
signicance at the 10-,5- and 1% level, respectively. Windmeijer
corrected S.E.s in parentheses. All models are estimated with a constant.
Sample range is 1980 - 2005 in 5-year averaged non-overlapping periods
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and signicance in the high-income sample. Further, the positive e¤ect of primary exports
is present and signicant in three models ((1) - (3)). However, looking at the test statistics
we clearly see that we should not rely condently on these results. None of the three
models show the expected autocorrelation pattern. We thus conclude that the e¤ect for
high-income countries is far less pronounced. Using the models terminology, the parents
assessment of the payo¤associated with their childrens education does not include a higher
payo¤ if they nd employment in the manufacturing export sector. A possible explanation
for the missing e¤ect on the average household fertility decision is that the manufacturing
sector in high-income countries does not necessarily call for additional schooling over and
above the already high educational attainment of workers. This seems plausible because the
general level of education in developed countries is su¢ cient for producing large shares of
their manufacturing exports. Further, the quality versus quantitydecision with respect to
children does not have as signicant an impact on households income as in less developed
economies. In high-income countries, social conditions and job opportunities for women
may point more towards the trade-o¤ between labor market participation of women and
the number of children than towards the trade-o¤ between the number of children and
education quality.
Second, in middle- and low-income countries (bottom panel) the situation appears
di¤erent. On the one hand, the impact of manufacturing exports on fertility is still (mostly)
negative, however it loses some signicance. On the other hand, we obtain a fairly strong
indication of a positive impact of primary exports on fertility. This supports Galor and
Mountfords hypothesis12 who predict that due to a limited incentive to invest in childrens
education in the primary sector, fertility levels are positively a¤ected. The lack of skill
12 In the empirical section of Galor and Mountfords paper this impact is not explicitly tested. However,
the authors detect a positive inuence of the general indicator trade/GDP on fertility in non-OECD
countries. Under the assumption that non-OECD countries trade mostly in little skill-intensive (primary)
goods, this implicitly supports their theory.
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intensity necessary for primary exports and consequently little human capital demand
therefore does not induce a demographic change as the more skill-intensive manufacturing
exports sector does. The nding that primary exports tend to positively a¤ect fertility
levels in lower-income countries is consistent with the conclusion of Weil and Wilde (2009),
who argue that economic development in countries that depend heavily on agricultural
production su¤er from high population growth. Further, we observe that the direction of
impact of our control variables does not change substantially over the subsamples, which
lends credibility to the estimations.
Robustness and Extension The two subsamples described above indicate that the
mechanism is more valid in developing economies. Therefore, to obtain an even more dif-
ferentiated view for developing countries we proceed by running further sets of estimations
for additional subsamples. Since dividing the sample used in the main analysis further
would reduce the individual sample size to as few as 20 observations, we now use the com-
plete sample with yearly data to obtain su¢ cient observations. In the now unbalanced
panel we use a GLS estimator and still control for time and country e¤ects. Table 2.3 gives
the estimation results. The panels from top to bottom are for income groups 3, 4 and 5,
respectively.
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Table 2.3: Trade and Fertility (Middle- and Low-Income Countries - Fixed
E¤ects Estimates)
Dependent: TFR Higher Middle Income (Group 3)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.005* 0.006* 0.007** 0.006** 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
lnfant Mortality 0.046*** 0.035** 0.034** 0.042***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
GDP p.c. 0.036*** 0.040***
(0.010) (0.011)
Fem.Schooling -0.280*** -0.259***
(0.021) (0.023)
Urbanization -0.084
(0.057)
Time trend (t) -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 657 654 654 603 603
Countries (n) 22 22 22 19 19
Years (t) 38 38 38 38 38
Dependent: TFR Lower Middle Income (Group 4)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.003* 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lnfant Mortality 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.203*** 0.186***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
GDP p.c. 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
Fem.Schooling 0.092*** 0.091***
(0.012) (0.011)
Urbanization 0.059**
(0.024)
Time trend (t) -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 845 842 842 810 810
Countries (n) 28 28 28 26 26
Years (t) 38 38 38 38 38
Dependent: TFR Low Income (Group 5)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.006** 0.005 0.006** 0.008** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
lnfant Mortality 0.279*** 0.270*** 0.180*** 0.438***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.050)
GDP p.c. 0.024** 0.028**
(0.011) (0.014)
Fem.Schooling 0.206*** 0.147***
(0.015) (0.017)
Urbanization 0.322***
(0.040)
Time trend (t) -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.015*** -0.013***
(0.00) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 354 354 354 272 272
Countries (n) 15 15 15 12 12
Years (t) 38 38 35 35 35
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is the total fertility rate (TFR). All variables
are used in natural logarithms. *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10-,5- and
1% level, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation robust S.E.s in parentheses.
Sample range is 1970 - 2007 (1973-2007 bottom panel) with yearly intervals.
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Interestingly, we do not see the same negative impact of manufacturing exports across
the subsamples. While in most higher and lower middle-income countries (top and mid-
dle panel) manufacturing exports negatively a¤ect fertility, the subsample for low-income
countries fails to show a single signicant estimate. A possible explanation is that modern
structures are too weakly developed and the role of manufacturing exports is marginal
and unable to a¤ect average fertility. Turning to the e¤ect of primary exports on fertility
we nd the strongest and positive impact in the group of least developed countries and
in four of our ve models, even a signicant impact. Even though the impact is positive
in the panels for income groups 3 and 4, it is not signicant in all cases. Besides these
di¤erentiated observations our split into subsamples further establishes the existence of a
di¤erential e¤ect of manufacturing and primary exports on fertility levels.
In addition to our ndings on the impact of trade in manufacturing and primary prod-
ucts on fertility in high-, middle and low-income countries, it is worth pointing out some
of the results for the control variables. Child mortality, generally acknowledged as one of
the main determinants of fertility, is - as expected - positively related to fertility, which is
consistent with Doces (2011), Jeon and Shields (2005), Lehmijoki and Palokangas (2009),
and Galor and Mountford (2008). In Table 2.2 we see that the impact is bigger in lower-
income than in high-income countries. This result is further rened in Table 2.3 where
the strength of impact varies considerably. While in least-developed countries the e¤ect
is strong, it decreases as the development level rises, with a very small impact in income
group 3 (top panel of Table 2.3). Intuitively, this is explained by lower child mortality in
more developed countries. This robust relationship yields an important result for policy-
making. If birth rates are to be brought down in low-income countries, lowering child
mortality is an important target. Female education also shows the expected sign across
most estimations in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. There is a clear negative relationship between
female education and fertility, a nding consistent with Becker et al. (2010) and Osili
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and Long (2008), for example. The labor force participation rate of women also a¤ects
fertility negatively, a result in line with existing empirical evidence (Pampel 1993 or Jeon
and Shields 2005). However, our estimations are not signicant. We have left out this
particular variable in our estimations for income groups 3 to 5 due to clear endogeneity
problems that are not addressed by the GLS estimator, so no further statements can be
retrieved. The presence of insignicant results makes sense because there are di¤erences in
opportunities for economically active women to raise children. A factory worker will nd
it more di¢ cult to take care of children than a woman working on a rural family-owned
eld, even though both women would count as economically active. We also control for
per capita income. The e¤ect of income on fertility (or population growth) is discussed
extensively in the literature.13 However, there are still supporters of a negative impact
of income on fertility as well as supporters of the contrary, namely a positive impact of
income on population growth. Our coe¢ cient estimates reect this controversy. We nd
both positive and negative relationships which can, however, indicate opposing underlying
e¤ects. Interestingly, in the estimations for income groups 3 to 5 we see a positive rela-
tionship in the top and bottom income groups. That is, in higher-income and low-income
countries GDP per capita increases fertility levels while in between (group 4) we witness
a less strong relation (small insignicant coe¢ cient). A commonly hypothesized u-shaped
relationship may be present that possibly depends on the substitution and income e¤ect
of children (Weil 2005).
To validate our estimations further we reestimate Tables 2.1 and 2.2 using the extended
yearly dataset and the GLS estimator. The re-estimation results are given in the appendix
in Table A2.3. The full sample consists of around 100 countries and 38 years. We have
around 3 000 observations for the complete sample of all countries and 1 200 and 1 800 for
13For a comprehensive review see e.g., Kelley (1988).
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the high-income and lower-income subsamples, respectively. All estimations support our
main nding of the di¤erential e¤ect that manufacturing exports and primary exports exert
on fertility. However, it is most visible in the lower-income sample (bottom panel). We
nd signicant negative e¤ects of manufacturing exports and signicant positive e¤ects of
primary exports. The consistent positive impact of child mortality and its clear di¤erence in
magnitude between higher- and lower-income countries further strengthen the estimation.
2.4 Conclusion
Our contribution provides supporting empirical evidence for Galor and Mountfords (2008)
hypothesis that international trade among developing and developed countries induces an
asymmetry in their demand for human capital, to which fertility rates react. While they
increase in developing countries, they decrease in developed countries. This is the case
because skill intensity in the trading sectors di¤ers and if it is benecial to invest in human
capital, fertility is driven down.
This contribution expands the existing empirical evidence given by Galor and Mount-
ford in various ways. First, we directly address di¤erent export sectors as determinants of
fertility and use exports per capita in two distinct sectors, primary exports and manufac-
turing exports. Second, we expand the analysis to include a panel setting and to control
for unobserved characteristics that are certainly important for fertility estimations. Third,
we include the most frequently suggested determinants of fertility as controls to make this
study more comparable to existing fertility literature. Lastly, by using subsamples we
can also point out di¤erent e¤ects at di¤erent development levels. Our panel regression
contains half-decade averages over the period 1980 to 2005 and covers around 70 countries.
In support of Galor and Mountfords (2008) theory we nd that manufacturing exports
lower fertility levels while primary exports have either a positive impact or none at all.
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We nd that this relation holds especially in developing countries, where education levels
are generally lower. However, this e¤ect is not present in the group of least developed
countries. Our ndings support the general proposition of Galor and Mountfords (2008)
work that trade is a driver of demographic transition and a possible explanation for the
great divergence in income levels across countries.
High fertility levels are often regarded as harmful to development. A recent survey by
the United Nations (World Fertility Policies 2011) has found that many governments regard
their fertility levels with concern. Hence, besides lowering infant mortality as our estimates
also show that global trade integration can support the goal of lowering fertility levels in
countries which export primarily skill-intensive manufacturing goods. However, as this also
works in the other direction countries whose exports consist of little skill-intensive (primary)
goods may face an aggregation of problems associated with high fertility levels. Further,
a strategy of export-led growth via skill-intensive manufactures may provide additional
benets by lowering fertility rates and thus impacting on the demographic transition that
can later pay o¤ in the shape of a demographic dividend.
2.5 Appendix to Chapter 2
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Table A2.3: Trade and Fertility (Complete Sample - Fixed E¤ects Esti-
mates)
Dependent: TFR All Countries
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
lnfant Mortality 0.211*** 0.208*** 0.183*** 0.188***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP p.c. 0.007 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
Fem.Schooling 0.058*** 0.050***
(0.010) (0.011)
Urbanization 0.009
(0.021)
Time trend (t) -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3150 3115 3116 2906 2905
Countries (n) 103 103 103 93 93
Years (t) 38 38 38 38 38
Dependent: TFR High Income Countries
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.007** -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lnfant Mortality 0.164*** 0.179*** 0.068*** 0.064***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029)
GDP p.c. 0.053*** 0.027*
(0.014) (0.016)
Fem.Schooling -0.454*** -0.438***
(0.043) (0.048)
Urbanization 0.074
(0.088)
Time trend (t) -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1294 1265 1266 1221 1220
Countries (n) 38 38 38 36 36
Years (t) 38 38 38 38 38
Dependent: TFR Low Income Countries
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Man. Exp. p.c. -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prim. Exp. p.c. 0.000 0.004** 0.004** 0.002* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
lnfant Mortality 0.278*** 0.271*** 0.228*** 0.226***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP p.c. -0.003 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Fem.Schooling 0.122*** 0.111***
(0.009) (0.010)
Urbanization 0.074***
(0.021)
Time trend (t) -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.016***
(0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 1856 1850 1850 1685 1685
Countries (n) 65 65 65 57 57
Years (t) 38 38 38 38 38
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is the total fertility rate (TFR). All variables
are used in natural logarithms. *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10-,5- and
1% level, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation robust S.E.s in parentheses.
Sample range is 1970 - 2007 with yearly intervals.
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Chapter 3
Fertility and Modernization: The Role of
Urbanization in Developing Countries
This chapter is based on joint work with Thomas Gries. The underlying article, pre-
sented here slightly modied, has been published in the Journal of International Develop-
ment (2015), forthcoming.
The chapter, just like the previous one, also contributes to the empirical fertility lit-
erature. However, while chapter two focusses on a very specic, though theoretically well
developed channel - the trade nexus-, this chapter focusses on the general relation be-
tween modernization and fertility in developing countries. Even more, it introduces the
currently developed view of urbanization as a modernization proxy in developing countries
into cross-country fertility analysis. By doing so it uses most recent research in development
economics and incorporates the ndings into the fertility literature. Further it is closer in
interpretation of various competing theories on fertility decline, namely the demographers
modernization theory. The ndings indicate that the distinctions made are necessary and
are capable of drawing conclusions for unusually large sample sizes.
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3.1 Introduction
In many cases recent trends in fertility change in developing countries indicate a slowdown
in the decline in fertility rates (Eastwood and Lipton 2011).1 Unlike in advanced economies,
this process is taking place in high-fertility settings that are not predicted in classic tran-
sition theory models. What is more, in some extreme cases the deceleration in decline
has reversed and become a rise (see, e.g., Zambia, Figure 31) Following economic theory
regarding fertility change, we propose a focus on distinct modern sector developments in
an empirical cross-country setting to analyze fertility trends in developing countries. Ex-
ploring the fertility transition along the lines of modern urbanization characteristics, i.e.,
incorporating various urbanization qualities, we demonstrate the importance of a function-
ing modern sector for fertility development in these countries. It also provides insights into
why fertility may respond di¤erently in todays developing countries than in now advanced
countries in their respective time of transition.
Figure 31 presents selected fertility rates from least developed countries. Even though
we generally observe declining fertility trends, it is also obvious that the rate of decline
is slowing and, what is more, even in the presence of unexpectedly high levels of fertility
(between 5 and 6 births per woman).
The economic literature that describes the transition from high to low-fertility regimes
rests fundamentally on the theory developed in Becker (1981) and Becker and Barro (1988).
Their mechanism of a child quantity-quality trade-o¤ faced by parents has become the
primary tool for describing changes in fertility regimes. Parents derive their utility from
both the number of children as well as their childrens level of education and are constrained
by both time and money. Two core channels impact on the trade-o¤. The rst proposes
that if economic development in the form of technological progress occurs, the returns on
1See also Shapiro & Gebreselassie (2008) on stalling fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Figure 31: Fertility in selected countries, 1960 - 2012 (based on World
Bank (2013) data).
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childrens education increase. On the one hand, this makes it more valuable to invest in
childrens education but on the other, it requires parents to have fewer children due to the
aforementioned constraints. A version of this mechanism is found in, e.g., Galor and Weil
(2000) or Kitaura and Yakita (2010). The second channel proposes that high mortality
rates would trigger a reduction in the investment on childrens education. High mortality
rates reduce the returns on educational investment, thus making it more expensive to invest
in child education. Therefore one would expect fertility rates not to react negatively to
mortality increases. This side of the trade-o¤ has been emphasized in one way or another
for example in Kalemli-Oczan (2002, 2003) and Soares (2005). That the trade-o¤ indeed
existed in the past has been empirically tested for the case of Prussia. Becker et al.
(2010) identies it using pre-industrial revolution census data. A major application of the
trade-o¤ is found in unied growth models that describe theoretically the transition from
stagnation to modern growth regimes (Galor and Weil 1996, 2000) and e¤ectively explain
the transition to industrialized economies during the industrial revolution.
Next, we establish why the modern sector is important for the aforementioned mech-
anism. The mechanism emphasizes the importance of education and predicts a decline in
fertility levels if returns on education rise. However, a rise in returns on education is gen-
erally attributed to an emerging modern sector, meaning an expansion in jobs that require
higher skills and consequently pay higher wages. This links modern sector development
with population decline. The importance of a modern sector for fertility decline via re-
turns on education is the core mechanism presented in Galor and Mountford (2008), who
focus on di¤erential international trade. A closely connected issue, the channel of modern
sector trade, is empirically conrmed in Gries and Grundmann (2014). However, there
are also models that do not focus on returns on education although they connect modern
sector development with fertility. For example, Lehmijoki and Palokangas (2009) map an
increase in womens relative wages via trade and their works complementarity to capital.
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This is then expected to lower the fertility rate. Sauré and Zoabi (2011) also focus on a
rise in womens labor force participation induced by modern sector trade. Higher labor
force participation is then associated with lower fertility levels. With or without an explicit
increase in human capital returns, the modern sector appears to be of great importance in
explaining the fertility transition in the economic literature.
The role of modernizationis also discussed in the demographic literature. According
to classical transition theory, modernizationthat leads to falling fertility rates comprises
falling mortality rates, economic development, education, and urbanization (Angeles 2010).
Urbanization is described as causing declining fertility rates in several frameworks. White
et al. (2008) put forth why urbanization is expected to reduce fertility levels. Children
in urban areas are less likely to contribute as early and as productively to family income
as they would in rural (agricultural) areas. Therefore the net benets of having more
children are diminished. Also, housing (space) is more expensive and having more children
would require parents to provide more space. Then, in urban areas access to modern birth
control may be facilitated, along with potentially easier access to better health services
in general. Finally, urban areas are also associated with ideational change in innovation-
di¤usion theories, leading to a dissipation of fertility-enhancing beliefs and attitudes (Reed
et al. 1999).
From the economic and demographic literature we infer the importance of a modern
sector that mostly emerges in urban agglomerations. Urbanization, measured as the pro-
portion of the population that lives in urban agglomerations, has itself been widely used as
an indicator of industrialization/modernization in empirical economic analyses (e.g., Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002, 2005).2 We believe that this practice is particularly
2Urbanization (or urban/rural residence) is also used in fertility estimations (e.g., Kalemli-Öczan 2012
or Canning et al. 2013). However, the evidence on its impact at the national level is mixed, certainly in
part due to the theme of this research.
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useful in historical cross-country samples (as done in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
2002) since it allows for large sample sizes due to an almost unmatched availability of
the indicator. However, the indicator itself may fail to incorporate very recent research
on urbanization in developing countries. Gollin et al. (2013) argue that urbanization in
these countries can be of di¤erent quality and call for a di¤erentiated treatment of so-
called production vs. consumption cities. While the former emerge due to an inux of
workers needed in production, the latter mostly provide (petty) services jobs for migrants.
As outlined above the Q-Q trade-o¤ arises (apart from changes in child mortality) from
increasing returns on education. However, these increasing returns are mostly associated
with the production type of city where urban agglomeration is driven by an enlargement of
the industrial base. The interpretation of urbanization as a process that is not necessarily
and purely driven by economic activity also lies at the heart of demographic research that
explains urbanization with demographic change (Dyson 2011) or presents it as a historical
process driven by institutional, technological, and population change (Fox 2012).
This research presents an analysis of the negative impact of modern sector development
on aggregate fertility development as hypothesized in the literature. More specically,
we approximate modern sector development with the rate of urbanization and, based on
recent research, incorporate the role of quality in urban sector development. The cross-
developing-country results show how di¤erent urban developments impact on the change
in country-level reproductive behavior.
Our results suggest that urbanization plays a role in determining the country-wide fer-
tility level. In a sample of around 130 developing countries we nd a negative, yet not
always robust, inuence of the degree of urbanization on the fertility level. While this can
be interpreted as supporting the idea of approximating modernization with the urbaniza-
tion indicator, it also demands caution. We hence further rene our measure of modern
structures to show that concerns about recent trends in urbanization (Gollin et al. 2013)
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should not be neglected in the context of demographic change. Urbanization with either
high slum prevalence or a narrow export sector base does not emerge as having a negative
impact. Our results show that in this case, we are rather dealing with a fertility-enhancing
situation in contrast to the main e¤ect. The major policy implication of these ndings is
that developing countries could support their demographic transition by developing pro-
duction cities that are characterized by less slum incidence and an industrial base that
supplies jobs to the population.
The remainder of this paper presents the data and methodology in the next section,
followed by the results. The last section concludes.
3.2 Data and Methodology
3.2.1 Data
Dependent variable: Fertility. We are interested in the behavior of the country-wide
fertility rate, as this indicator is of major importance in the analysis of demographic change.
More precisely, we use the total fertility rate (TFR), which is frequently used in cross-
country studies on fertility behavior and is constructed as follows:
TFR = y 
bX
a=1
birthsa
number of womena
(3.1)
In eq. 3.1 the age-specic (age or age-group a ) fertility rate (births per woman) is
simply summed up over all ages or age groups and multiplied by the number of years in
each age group/cohort (y). The TFR is thus constructed using age-specic fertility rates
proposing the fertility rate a woman at the beginning of her childbearing years would face
over the course of her life. Because it is based on cohort/age-specic fertility rates it is
insensitive to age distribution. In other words, it does not pick up on declines that result
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from a change in cohort size, as a di¤erent indicator (number of births) would certainly
do. Further, even though the TFR registers whether a cohort delays fertility, it could be
rather slow to do so on a yearly basis. However, as we are interested in longer time-horizons
and the underlying structural settings, we average the data to ensure that we capture the
longer run e¤ects correctly. The data is taken from the World Banks Word Development
Indicators (WDI).
Independent variables: Urbanization. Urbanization is dened as the percentage of
people living in urban agglomerations as given by national statistical o¢ ces. The data
is also taken from the WDI. The use of the indicator in this plain denition may reect
the idea that the more urbanized a country, the more people are a¤ected by modernized
societal structures both in terms of behavioral and structural economic changes and there-
fore the lower the average fertility rate. However, as implied by research by Gollin et al.
(2013) this indicator although extensively used and widely available may not fully cap-
ture modernization e¤ects because recent increases in urbanization in developing countries
have been identied as not being driven by industrialization. To relate urbanization more
closely to the theoretical hypothesis we therefore augment it in the estimation with the
two following qualifying indicators.3
Slum incidence. We assume urban agglomerations with a higher degree of slum inci-
dence to remove the characteristics that allow for the theoretically developed channel for
fertility to decline through modernization. From an ideational point of view this is the
spread of modern social norms accompanying higher living standards or, from an economic
perspective, the spread of higher-skilled labor activities across larger shares of the popu-
lation. The slum population is mostly forced to either engage in subsistence farming or in
3For a further graphical motivation for the hypothesized relationship we provide plots of the association
between urban fertility and the two quality indicators, slum incidence and export diversication, in the
appendix (gure 2 and 3).
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collecting recyclables from waste, providing petty services, or even begging (UN-Habitat
2010). Moreover, we also assume the average provision of health and sanitation services to
be worse. This presumably impacts overall health in general and child health in particular
(Günther and Hartgen 2012). The United Nations Human Settlements Program provides
estimates on slum incidence for many developing countries worldwide that comprise the
percentage of the urban population that lives under slum conditions. Slum conditions are
present if one or more of three conditions are not met for a household. From the informa-
tion for slum incidence in 2005 we create a dummy variable indicating whether the country
falls into the higher or lower slum incidence category.4
Degree of diversication in exports. We follow the idea of Fox (2014) and use this
indicator to obtain information on urban economic conditions. We assume that a robust
urban economy will induce the opportunity structures needed for the quantity-quality
trade-o¤ to work and that it is characterized by a broad income base and by diversied
and extensive trade. The variable, interacted with urbanization, provides further evidence
of the quality of the urbanization at hand. We use a diversication index from United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development that ranges from 0 to 1 and create an
additional dummy variable indicating whether a country has shown little (index > 0.7)
mean diversication in the available period.5
Controls: We use GDP per capita to approximate the level of income, which is a
generally acknowledged determinant of fertility. However, the precise impact may depend
on the perception of children, i.e., whether they are perceived as a productive asset or
a consumption good (Drèze and Murthi 2001). In the sample of developing countries
the impact may be positive due to a dominant view of children as a form of old-age
4There is no convention on what exactly denes high slum incidence. We use a 50% threshold for higher
slum incidence which is in line with reports of UN-Habitat. See, e.g., UN-Habitat (2008) chapter 2.5.
5The threshold is placed around the samplesmean (and median). A variation of the used threshold
does not qualitatively alter our results.
64
security or an inexpensive source of additional labor. GDP per capita is used in levels and
taken from the World Bank (WDI) in constant 2005 dollars. For a decrease in our next
control variable, infant mortality, the theory rather strongly predicts a negative impact on
children born.6 To have a desired number of children parents have to have more children if
infant mortality is high. However at the same time infant mortality may not be exogenous
to fertility. Especially in developing countries with hygiene and health problems, high
fertility may also be accompanied by high infant mortality. The data is taken from CME
(2010). Next, we control for female education. Education may raise the opportunity costs
of childbearing and would therefore reduce the number of children born. It may also be
the case that especially in poorly developed regions, education enables women to have
the desired number of children (Buyinza and Hisali 2014). Consequently, the e¤ect on
fertility is expected to be negative. Female education is approximated with the (gross)
secondary school enrollment rate provided in the World Development Indicators (2013).
In an extended specication we also follow recent research by Galor and Mountford (2008)
and Gries and Grundmann (2014) and include manufacturing exports (as a proportion of
merchandise exports) as a factor that impacts on fertility change, because a higher skill-
content in trade (manufacturing vs. agriculture) gives rise to the Q-Q trade-o¤ in the
fertility decision.
The dataset comprises around 130 developing countries7 and 10 ve-year- averaged,
non-overlapping points of data in time from 1962 to 2012. Table 3.1 shows the summary
statistics.
6For a recent analysis of infant mortality on fertility see, e.g., Canning et al. (2013); for a theoretical
approach in the Becker-type model, see, e.g., Doepke (2005).
7The included countries are listed in Table A3.1 in the appendix according to their level of slum incidence.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
TFR 4.688 1.856 1.14 9.154 1358
GDP per capita 1909.556 1908.38 65.605 13223.427 1097
Female Schooling 46.016 33.326 0 152.318 925
Infant mortality 66.856 42.887 4.5 210.007 1170
Urbanization 39.732 20.676 2.211 93.260 1400
Manufacturing exports 26.069 25.229 0 97.408 902
Export diversication 0.714 0.11 0.376 0.907 536
Slum incidence 51.932 26.162 2 99 319
3.2.2 Model
Following the country-level estimations in Kalemli-Oczan (2012) and Canning et al. (2013)
we set up a panel estimation model for the total fertility rate and include our independent
variable, urbanization, in both its natural and its qualied version8:
TFRit = +   URBit +   URBit Di +  X0it + t + i + "it (3.2)
where TFRit is the total fertility rate, URBit is the urbanization rate, Di is a dummy
that indicates whether there is high slum incidence or low export diversication or both
(in di¤erent specications), X0it is a vector of control variables. t is a time-xed e¤ect
and i represents the country-specic e¤ect while "it represents an iid error term. The
subscripts t and i identify the time and observational unit. Because most of our data is
available in a cross-section time-series format we can benet from controlling for i , the
country-specic, time-constant term. While panel data generally increases sample size and
allows for a higher level of detail, the possibility to control for the unobserved xed e¤ect
is immensely valuable in the context of fertility estimation. Specically, it enables us to
8A comparable use of dummy variable interactions in a cross-country panel-xed e¤ects model may also
be found in, e.g., Rodrik (2008) or Arena (2008).
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control for the underlying e¤ect of cultural or social norms that do not vary (greatly) over
time. If we do not control for this in the estimation, we would almost certainly obtain
biased estimation results.
3.2.3 Estimation design
To acknowledge that ignoring the country-specic e¤ect in 3.2 may lead to a biased estima-
tion due to unobserved heterogeneity we rst use a xed e¤ects estimator for the panel.9
While our control variables are chosen to control for the commonly discussed factors that
impact on country-wide fertility levels, we are, due to the panel structure, also able to
control for time-invariant country intrinsic e¤ects. In the case of fertility this frequently
involves cultural and social characteristics that are not clearly measurable but neverthe-
less inuence aggregate fertility decisions. Technically, the estimator subtracts the mean
of the observation within groups and thus cancels out time-invariant e¤ects. However, it
also assumes covariates to not correlate with the error, that is, strict exogeneity. In this
respect two of our included control variables may appear especially troublesome. Both
child mortality and female schooling may be inuenced by fertility. Even though it would
be desirable to circumvent the problem with a suitable outside instrument, it is hard to
nd such an instrument in macro panels with a long time dimension. Therefore we rely
in a second step on within-instrumentation of endogenous covariates, based on the work
of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The estimators developed
therein belong to the class of GMM estimators and rely on specic moment conditions.
Broadly speaking, we use lagged-level data to instrument endogenous covariates in a rst-
di¤erenced equation and lagged rst di¤erences in a level equation. We report diagnostics
for the validity of the used instruments.
9We also estimate a pooled regression model with ols. It includes the time-xed e¤ects and clustered
standard errors at the country level. However, the results do not change.
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3.3 Results
In Table 3.2 we present the main estimations corresponding to the hypothesis. The rst
two columns show regression results from the same model, but they di¤er according to the
estimation design in the estimators we use. Model (1) is the xed-e¤ects panel estimator
and in model (2) we use the system GMM estimator where we instrument infant mortal-
ity, female schooling, and also GDP per capita. The model includes the modernization
proxy urbanization on its own. Both estimators indicate a negative yet non-signicant
relationship with fertility. We can interpret this in two ways. First, the modernization
aspect may have been picked up by the controls female schoolingand infant mortality,
both of which clearly indicate their relevance in the relationship with the hypothesized
directions of impact. However, it is also possible that urbanization, based on the recent
literature, does not fully represent what characterizes modernization. This is our main
hypothesis and therefore the result is to be expected to the degree that urbanization does
not necessarily capture the fertility-lowering e¤ects assumed in the theoretical economic
literature. Therefore, we insert a dummy for slum incidence to qualify the urbanization
measure further in the next two columns. Again, we present both estimators for the same
model. The model now includes the plain urbanization measure as well as urbanization
interacted with the dummy for slum incidence. Since the dummy takes the value zero or
one we may interpret the coe¢ cient of the interaction as the di¤erence to the e¤ect when
the dummy takes the value zero, i.e., solely the coe¢ cient of the urbanization term. In
other words, we di¤erentiate the urbanization e¤ect and interpret the interaction term as
part of the urbanization impact in high slum-incidence countries. In columns (3) and (4)
we observe that the change in e¤ect is positive and signicant for both our estimators. In
line with the hypothesis that in less developed urban agglomerations (the ones with higher
slum incidence) the e¤ect on the aggregate fertility level is not negative becomes visible.
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In the last two columns of Table 3.2 we follow, as mentioned above, the idea of Fox (2014)
and create another qualifying dummy variable. It is created according to the degree of
specialization in exports. Following the rationale that a broad industrial production base
will most likely provide the agglomeration that can be associated with fertility lowering
channels (investment in education), a lack of export diversication points towards a less
developed urban agglomeration. We may interpret the interaction term in analogy to the
ones before. In this case the xed e¤ects estimator (column (5)) does not indicate a pos-
itive deviation from the main e¤ect, however the coe¢ cient remains non-signicant. By
contrast, as seen in the last column there is again supportive evidence that the hypothesis
is correct. The deviation of the main e¤ect is signicantly positive. Even though the main
e¤ect of urbanization is negative across the estimations, it is hardly ever signicant. Where
it is signicant, as in column (3), we nd a combined non-signicant impact for countries
with a decit in the quality of their urbanization. This supports two main results. The
rst is that urbanization does not necessarily capture the modernization e¤ects assumed in
the theoretical model to lower fertility levels; the second is that urbanizing countries with
a lack of quality in urbanization will certainly not benet in terms of fertility decreases
that may be associated with urbanization (as in column (3)).
In Table 3.3 we show extended and robustness estimations and again present both xed-
e¤ects and GMM estimations. In columns (1) and (2) the previously separately inserted
dummy variables jointly interact with urbanization. The interpretation remains the same,
however in these cases the estimated deviation from the main e¤ect stems from countries
with both high slum incidence and high export concentration. In other words, the quality
of urbanization is even more clearly identied than before. And, as expected, the results
closely match the previous ones. In other words, urbanization qualied by both high
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slum-incidence and high export concentration increases the e¤ect on fertility levels. The
following two columns ((3) + (4)) are presented based on research by Jedwab (2013). In
an analysis of Sub-Saharan countries he identies that much urbanization in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) has taken place (and still is taking place) without industrialization (the
fertility reducing factor). In our framework this is easily adopted by introducing a region
dummy for SSA. We thus test the hypothesis that urban agglomerations especially in the
least developed region in the world, i.e., SSA, have structural decits in terms of incentive
provision to reduce fertility. Indeed, the results strongly support this and even gain in size
and signicance.
Galor and Mountford (2008) and Gries and Grundmann (2014) provide evidence that
the skilled-labor content of trade also plays a role in determining fertility levels. In order to
account for this impact factor we include a variable of manufacturing exports in columns
(5) and (6). This change in model specication does not alter our ndings on the e¤ect of
qualied urbanization. Finally, we reestimate the model and change the constraints on the
time parameter. In column (7) the time e¤ect is altogether excluded and in column (8) is
set to be linear. Both versions of the model maintain the e¤ect previously found.
Interpreting the results from a less economic perspective leads us to conclude that the
di¤usion of modern social norms regarding fertility behavior does not necessarily and to an
equal degree take place in urban agglomerations. We can assume that urban agglomerations
characterized by a large proportion of the population living in slum conditions will be
much less e¤ective in spreading the norms that are required for a measurable decrease in
aggregate fertility. Our results lend great support to (i) the hypothesis that the quality
of urbanization varies and (ii) this needs to be regarded with care. (ii) is not only valid
in cross-country economic development estimations, but - as our results underline - also
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in cross-country fertility estimations. This suggests that recent research into urbanization
and its quality (Gollin et al. 2013) also contributes to the understanding of longer-run
changes in population development.
3.4 Conclusion
In the context of demographic change, this contribution creates a link between the theo-
retical prediction that modernization supports demographic change and recently presented
evidence concerning urbanization in developing countries. In theory, modernization ought
to be accompanied by industrialization which provides jobs and incentives to invest in
skills, a situation that has long been attributed to urban agglomerations. This, and its
wide availability (and also its rather easy comparability), has lead urbanization to emerge
as a frequently used indicator for modern structures. However, recent research indicates
that urbanization may well take place without the modernization characteristics often at-
tributed to it. The theory on the change in reproductive behavior points out necessary
incentives to invest in skills, which is possible in more modern (urban) structures, hence
we present a panel cross-country fertility estimation for developing countries with a rened
view on urbanization.
On the one hand, we are able to assemble a large cross-developing country dataset
with a time dimension of 50 years thanks to the wide availability of urbanization; on the
other hand, we have to qualify the measure of urbanization. In this study we do so by
interacting urbanization with slum incidence and export diversication. Further, by using
urbanization we also account for social interaction e¤ects identied in the demographic
literature. The estimation of the large cross-developing country panel dataset, where we
also take up reverse causality issues by adopting a GMM estimation approach, indicates
that the presence of low-quality urbanization, i.e., an agglomeration without the economic
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(and social) structures to provide higher skilled jobs, impacts signicantly more positively
on fertility than higher-quality urbanization.
Against the background of a strong slowdown in fertility declines in least developed
countries, an important implication of this nding is the necessity to create quality urban-
ization in order to eventually benet from demographic change.
3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A3.1: Countries included by slum incidence
Higher slum incidence ( >50% in 2005)
Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh Belize, Bolivia, Bhutan,
Botswana, Central African Republic, Cote dIvoire Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.),
Comoros, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Gabon Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Kenya, Cambodia, Lao PDR Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique,
Mauritania Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Nepal, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra
Leone Somalia, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen (Rep.), Zambia
Lower slum incidence (<50% in 2005)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, India,
Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Libya, St. Lucia, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, Mexico,
Myanmar, Namibia, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Paraguay, El Salvador, Suri-
name, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam,
South Africa, Zimbabwe
The export diversication index provided by the Unctad has a greater value the less a
country is diversied in its exports.
74
1
2
3
4
5
6
ur
ba
n 
fe
rti
lit
y
0 20 40 60 80 100
slum incidence
Source: DHS and UN-Habitat data
Developing countries: Mean 2000 - 2012
Urban fertility and slum incidence
Figure A31: Urban fertility and slum incidence
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Chapter 4
Modern Sector Development - The Role of
Exports and Institutions in Developing Countries
This chapter is based on joint work with Thomas Gries. The underlying article, di¤ering
slightly from this chapter, has been published in the conference paper series 2015 of the
Verein für Socialpolitik as "Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015:
Theorie und Politik - Session: Trade, nance and institutions E08-V2". Similar to the
previous ones, the chapter is also related to the theme of modernization in developing
countries. While chapters two and three empirically connect the degree of modernization
as a determinant of fertility levels, this chapter focusses on the drivers of modernization
itself. In the line of argumentation that is, it picks up the previous results - broadly,
that modernization drives fertility - and consequently draws the attention now to the
determinants of modernization.
4.1 Introduction
A thriving modern sector is of major importance for a countrys long-term and sustainable
development. The historical experience of todays advanced economies suggests that the
path to growth in these countries was accompanied by a structural shift towards a modern
manufacturing sector. While western countries already industrialized as early as the mid
19th century, newly industrialized countries such as South Korea or Taiwan massively ex-
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panded their manufacturing sector in the mid to late 20th century. Moreover, recently we
have been witnessing the emergence of a strong Chinese manufacturing sector that drives
the overall economic performance of the whole country. In addition to such anecdotal evi-
dence, recent research by Rodrik (2013) on labor productivity in manufacturing underlines
the importance of understanding the mechanisms that drive development in the modern,
respectively the manufacturing sector.1
In the literature a number of empirical and theoretical studies emphasize the impor-
tance of a modern sector for overall economic performance. While some contributions
(e.g., Szirmai 2012, De Vries et al. 2012, Timmer and De Vries 2009, Rodrik 2009, Peneder
2003) document the positive impacts of modern sector dynamics on overall economic de-
velopment empirically,2 others suggest that there are links between sectoral and general
productivity or development by using an analytical framework (e.g., Duarte and Restuccia
2010, Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 2013, Dekle and Vandenbrouke 2012).
Figure 41 illustrates the correlation between overall and sectoral growth using data
from the sample examined in this study. We map growth rates of the manufacturing sector
(upper panel) and growth rates of GDP, both in per capita terms, in developing countries
over two time periods between 1980 and 2010. In comparison we map the association be-
tween the agricultural sector (lower panel) and growth rates of GDP. While both sectors
appear to be positively correlated with per capita GDP growth, we see a clear relatively
stronger association of the modern sector in these developing countries.3 How important
1Throughout we focus on the whole manufacturing sector and term it modern especially vis-à-vis a
traditional agricultural sector in developing countries. A further renement of sub-sectoral activity is not
subject of this study and would greatly alter data requirements.
2This literature focuses on the impact of modern (manufacturing) sector growth on overall growth but
(mostly) also acknowledges that e.g., a service sector can play an important role in development (see, e.g.,
Szirmai and Verspagen 2011). However, as documented in de Vries et al. (2015) service sectors productivity
gains can mostly not match those of the manufacturing sector.
3Our sample includes 75 countries; see appendix for details.
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Figure 41: Association between sectoral and overall growth in developing
countries, 1980 - 2010.
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Figure 42: Employment growth: sectoral and overall, by income group.
a focus on the modern manufacturing sector is can also be derived from gure 42. By
using data from the ten sector database we relate overall employment growth with sectoral
employment growth by income group. Again the top panel shows gures for the manu-
facturing sector while the bottom panel shows gures for the agricultural sector. While
the relation between manufacturing employment growth and overall employment growth
maintains stable across income groups, this does not hold true for agricultural sector em-
ployment growth for the higher income group. In other words, the opportunity to further
enjoy employment growth becomes more viable with the manufacturing sector than with
the agricultural sector after reaching a certain level of income and development.
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However, while the positive relationship between manufacturing activities and overall
growth achieves consensus among economists- naturally the question arises of what ex-
actly makes a countrys (modern) manufacturing sector grow. What drives the economic
dynamics in this important sector? Surprisingly, there is little evidence provided in the
literature and to the best of our knowledge no comprehensive empirical estimation of a
modern sectors development drivers. A possible reason may be that the literature about
structural change received considerable attention lately and focussed on descriptions and
benets. For example Fagerberg (2000) shows that structural change occurs when within
manufacturing economies focus on the technologically most progressive sub-sectors. This
lets manufacturing sectors productivity grow faster. Similarly, Peneder (2003) shows that
greater shares in high-tech industries positively inuence income growth. And also ex-
plicitly for developing regions McMillan and Rodrik (2011) show that structural change is
conducive to development if labor shifts to higher productivity sectors4. Our question of
driving factors is connected to the literature that documents the importance of structural
change, but is still distinctly di¤erent. While we take the sectors importance for long-run
development5 as given (as thoroughly argued), we ask what promotes this sector and thus
what are the determinants to modernize the economy by manufacturing expansion. That
is, we will explore direct growth determinants for this sector and do so along the lines of
the existing (overall-)growth literature. Herrendorf et al. (2014) review a large body of
mostly theoretical advances in the structural change literature and nd that most times
there is a consideration of exogenously given changes impacting on the process of structural
transformation. Though we are not directly concerned with an economys relative compo-
4Similarly, Gollin et al. (2014) document a striking di¤erence in productivity between the agricultural
and non-agricultural sector in developing countries. This may imply a misallocation of production factors
that, if changed, bears great potential for development.
5 Importance in the sense of important for development. It is well known that in relative size the
manufacturing sector in developing countries often does not exceed 20% of output.
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sitional structure, we depart from to suggestion of Herrendorf et al. (2014) and ask for the
factors behind the modern sectors evolvement, the drivers. The structural change litera-
ture that incorporates internationalization is narrow, in particular more recent studies are
not at all numerous. Matsuyama (2009) proposes an open economy model for structural
change including a trade channel that may positively impact on the employment share of
the manufacturing sector. More quantitatively this is supported in Uy et al. (2013) for the
experience of South Korean manufacturing.
Therefore, in this paper we adopt a somewhat broader view. We take manufacturing
sector growth as a broader indication for the economic modernization process in a devel-
oping country. We ask, to what extend does a developing countrys society have access to
modern sector income generation and what are the determinants of this economic modern-
izations process. That is, we are interested in the di¤usion of modern sector production
within the society. We indicate access to modern sector income generation by manufactur-
ing sector value added per capita. As this measure describes modern production per capita
it may be interpreted as an indicator for the spread of modern economic activities within a
countrys population. Our modern sector perspective shall capture its role in long-run de-
velopment and the sector as a source to provide fundamental societal and economic change
on a potential path towards higher stages of development and income. With interest in
pinning down potential determinants of this modernization we focus on the role of exports
and institutions for the development of this important sub-sector.
Why is the manufacturing sector expected to promote growth and in particular, eligible
to be associated with trade and institutions? The answer, we argue, lies on the one hand in
its special characteristics and on the other hand, in the mechanisms that connect trade and
institutions with development in the general growth literature. Szirmai (2012) thoroughly
reviews the key characteristics (that also make the sector especially relevant for overall
growth). First, the sector is said to provide better opportunities for capital accumulation,
81
which is a crucial factor for growth. Typically, capital intensity is higher and manufacturing
is more concentrated than spatially dispersed agriculture. Second, the manufacturing sector
evokes higher productivity increases, a mechanism that has also been referred to as the
structural change bonus (Rodrik 2009, Temple and Woessmann 2006, Timmer and de
Vries 2009). Apart from opportunities for economies of scale, linkage and spillover e¤ects
are important aspects of the modern manufacturing sector. The linkage e¤ect refers to
a situation where direct forward and backward interaction (linkages) between di¤erent
(sub)sectors occur and present positive externalities to investment. Spillover e¤ects are
special externalities to investments in knowledge and technology and occur both within
and across sectors.
Our proposition, namely that exports impact on modern sector development, is guided
by the trade literature on the impacts of manufacturing exports on overall development
(e.g., Herzer and Nowak-Lehmann 2006, Berg et al. 2012, Hesse 2008, Imbs and Wacziarg
2003, Ledermann and Maloney 2003, Herzer et al. 2006, and Naudé et al. 2010). While the
literature on general trade and development remains rather inconclusive6, the line of argu-
mentation in the mentioned strand suggests that a vertical diversication of exports, i.e.,
manufacturing in addition to primary products, is benecial (Herzer and Nowak-Lehman
2006, Berg et al. 2012) because it alleviates (export) price instabilities for primary prod-
ucts (Hesse 2008). This is also supported by Lederman and Maloney (2003), who nd
that an export sector that concentrates on natural resources has a rather negative impact
on growth. Further, the benets of exports of and diversication towards manufacturing
products include i) (rm-level and industry-wide) productivity and e¢ ciency gains (Herzer
6See, e.g., Sachs and Warner (1995), Dollar and Kraay (2003), Alesina et al. (2000), Frankel and Romer
(1999) or Wacziarg (2001) for a positive account of the impact of trade on growth, and Rodriguez and
Rodrik (2001) for a critical account. Further, Birdsall and Hamoudi (2002) focus on the inadequacy of the
openness measure in the debate, while Greenaway et al. (2002) suggest an unfavorable time framing of
the analysis. Very recent empirical studies also focus on trade liberalization in times of crisis (Falvey et al.
2012) and on cross-country heterogeneity in the trade-income relationship (Herzer 2013).
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et al. 2006, Naudé et al. 2010, Melitz 2003, Dogan et al. 2011), ii) (knowledge) spillovers
and di¤usion (Herzer et al. 2006, Naudé et al. 2010), and iii) the loosening of a countrys
foreign exchange constraint (Naudé et al. 2010). We argue that the benets of vertical
diversication vis-à-vis traditional primary production7 are channeled through the manu-
facturing sector with the special characteristics outlined above, and naturally most of these
e¤ects will primarily have an impact on the modern manufacturing sector. Some empirical
evidence for the benecial channel of trade is presented in Chandran and Munusamy (2009)
for the case of Malaysian manufacturing.
Similarly to trade, or more precisely exports, institutions may well prove a determinant
of manufacturing sector dynamics. The broad discussion of the impact of institutions on
growth dates back to North (1990) and has spawned inuential research that argues that
it is relevant (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2005, Rodrik 2002). Thus, if institutions matter in
the hypothesized way to the aggregate economy, we would expect them to be all the more
important to modern sector development. As the concept of institutions is highly com-
plex, we highlight only some of the aspects. A much-discussed institution that is highly
relevant to our analysis is property rights. Acemoglu et al. (2001) focus on expropriation
risk as a dimension of property rights enforcement and nd that this has a strong impact
on per-capita income development. When it comes to the modern sector, we consider this
important as the manufacturing sector is characterized by higher capital needs, so conse-
quently uncertain property rights (in this case expropriation risk) can hamper investment.
A second dimension of property rights that is presumably important to the modern sector
is the availability of contractual enforcement institutions. Focusing on the rm environ-
ment, Johnson et al. (2002) nd, without di¤erentiating any further, that weak property
7 Imbs and Wazciarg (2003) analyze the distribution and nd u-shaped empirical evidence that countries
are diversied according to their development level with low and high levels of development representing
specialisation and in between higher diversication.
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rights prevent rms from investing their prots.
In our panel analysis of a sample of 75 developing countries from 1970 until 2005 we
nd evidence of the importance of both manufacturing exports and institutional quality
for manufacturing sector growth. These ndings are robust across model specications and
di¤erent estimation strategies. While we are also able to underline the importance of secure
property rights as an economic institution, we are unable to conclude that manufacturing
exports are equally important across all income levels. The remainder of the paper is
structured as follows. The next section contains our empirical analysis with an in-depth
description of model, estimation strategy, and data, followed by a results section including
tables. The last section concludes.
4.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we map out the econometric model and explain our dataset. We are par-
ticularly interested in whether exports and institutions drive manufacturing sector devel-
opment. Based on the literature referenced above, we are positive that it is possible to
establish this link empirically. Our estimations are based on a GMM estimator that ex-
plicitly accounts for endogeneity among the regressors as well as country-specic e¤ects.
However, we also use several other estimators to review our primary resultsrobustness.
In the following we motivate the model and the estimation technique, and discuss several
of the estimators that are common in growth estimations.
4.2.1 Model and Methodology
We analyze a panel of 75 developing countries over the period 1970 to 2005, which is
split into six non-overlapping ve-year intervals. Since we wish to identify the drivers of
manufacturing sector growth, we estimate the model as follows:
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ymit   ymi(t 1) = grmit = + ymi(t 1) + Expmit + Instit + Contit + t + i + "it (4.1)
where the subscripts i and t denote country and time, respectively. ym is manufacturing
output in logarithmic form, Expmand Inst represent the regressors of interest, exports in
manufacturing and institutions while Cont is a varying set of control variables.  and  are
unobserved period- and country-specic e¤ects,  is a common intercept and " is an i.i.d.
error term. In our half-decade panel we average most variables over the time period. This
removes short cycles that are not of interest here, and therefore displays the relationship
of the variables within ve years. We hypothesize that the time frame is well chosen to
capture the e¤ects of our independent variables on our dependent one, that is we expect
the e¤ects to materialize within ve years. However, even though commonly conducted
and necessary averaging the variables comes at the cost of reducing sample size and losing
variation. The lagged term of ym captures the convergence present in manufacturing as
found by Rodrik (2013) and is the beginning of period value of the dependent variable.
For example, we regress the growth rate of manufacturing output between 1990 and 1995
on the control variables averaged over the same time period but also on the initial value of
manufacturing output in 1990. The panel specication enables us to include , a control for
unobserved country-inherent and time-invariant e¤ects. These may otherwise be a source
of endogeneity from omitted variables. We are therefore able to control for characteristics
including geographical and population features such as natural resources, colonial history,
climate, and remoteness. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) even argue that institutional
quality and the political system can be captured. The time e¤ects we control for () pick
up shocks common to the whole system, e.g., world market uctuations.
However, if rewritten, equation (4.1) represents a classic dynamic model with a lagged
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dependent variable
ymit = + (1 + )y
m
i(t 1) + Exp
m
it + Instit + Contit + t + i + "it (4.2)
that introduces known estimation problems. The inclusion of  is especially problematic
for the conventional OLS estimator. For consistency, the country-specic e¤ects would have
to be orthogonal to other regressors (Caselli et al. 1996), a feature that has to be ruled
out due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable.
A prominent approach is to use a class of estimators which rst start by eliminating
the country-specic term by either taking deviations from period averages and focusing on
within-country variation (xed-e¤ects or least squares dummy variable estimator, LSDV)
or by using period averages right away (between estimator) (DeJong and Ripoll 2006).
The former has been found to be consistent only for a large time dimension, a feature
that most macroeconomic panels, including ours, lack. However, as the bias is well-known
(Nickell 1981) bias-correcting estimators have been developed for small-T panels (e.g.,
Kiviet 1995, or for unbalanced panels, Bruno 2005). Even though the latter estimator
already deals successfully with this bias it still requires, as does the xed-e¤ects estimator,
strictly exogeneous regressors.8 If this is not given, there is a lasting contemporaneous
correlation between regressors and disturbances which aggravates the estimation (Caselli
et al. 1996). We have to acknowledge that imposing the strict exogeneity restriction on our
regressors would be highly critical because when it comes to our two variables of interest,
exports and institutions, one can convincingly argue that they are not only causes but also
e¤ects of manufacturing development. For example the rm-level literature on exports
often argues that there may be more productive companies selecting themselves into the
8The estimator is implemented in Stata in the routine xtlsdvc. We use the Blundell-Bond estimator for
the initial estimates, apply a bias correction of order O(1/NT^2) and use 200 repetitions to bootstrap the
variance-covariance matrix. However, estimates do not change when we change these settings.
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export market, which would mean a reverse causality also in the aggregate case, or that
exports enhance a companys productivity through exposition to international competition
or economies of scale.9 The latter is the channel explored in this research. However, as we
only want to capture the channel from exports to sectoral growth we have to best avoid
the potential source of the endogeneity bias.
An often-used solution for this problem is to use the system GMM estimator proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM estimator
is similar to the di¤erence GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Both
estimators use a di¤erenced version of equation (4.1)
grmit   grmi(t 1) = (  ) + (ymi(t 1)   ymi(t 2)) + (Expmit   Expmi(t 1)) (4.3)
+(Instit   Insti(t 1)) + (Contit   Conti(t 1))
+(t   t 1) + (i   i) + ("it   "i(t 1))
to eliminate the country-xed e¤ect i. Endogeneity concerns associated with the regressors
are circumvented by using within-instruments. In our model it is particularly important
to account for the potential endogeneity problem for two reasons. First, both variables
of interest, institutions and exports, can be determined by manufacturing development.
Second, the included control variables may aw the estimation if they are not exogenous.
The use of within-instruments, that is, the use of instruments from the available data, is an
appealing approach since we would struggle to nd convincing instruments from outside.
Under two assumptions we may nd internal instruments for the rst-di¤erenced equation:
(a) the error "it is not serially correlated; and (b) the variables in levels are weakly exoge-
9Examples of both may be found in e.g. Greenaway and Kneller (2007) or Greenaway et al. (2007).
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nous, i.e. potentially correlated with past (and current) disturbances but not with future
errors. Under these conditions lagged levels may prove to be valid instruments for their
rst di¤erences. However, Easterly and Levine (2001) note that lagged levels of persistent
regressors may prove to be weak instruments in equation (4.3) and bias the estimation.
Further, the sole use of di¤erences leaves information about the level relationship unused
(DeJong and Ripoll, 2006) and reduces the time dimension of the sample. Especially the
latter fact is critical as our time dimension is already short (T = 6). In order to circum-
vent the arising problems the system GMM estimator has been introduced to combine
the rst-di¤erence equation (4.3) with the level equation (4.1). In order to obtain lagged
rst-di¤erences as valid instruments in the levels equation a further assumption has to be
made: rst-di¤erences may not be correlated with the country-xed e¤ect.
Even though this estimator controls for many caveats in dynamic panel data estimation,
it hinges on assumptions that need to be validated. We follow Roodman (2006) and
report next to regression coe¢ cients and sample-size important test statistics, which are
designed to validate the identifying assumptions. These include the Hansen-J test for over-
identication (Hansen, 1982) and Arellano and Bonds (1991) tests for autocorrelation. The
Hansen tests null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous and thus should not
be rejected. As this test may be weakened by instrument proliferation (Roodman 2009),
we limit the number of instruments10 and report their count. Next, we report the m1 
and m2  tests for autocorrelation in the di¤erenced errors ("it   "i(t 1)). The presence of
second-order serial correlation (in di¤erenced errors) implies rst order serial correlation of
the "it which violates our assumptions. Therefore we should not reject the null of no serial
correlation in the m2  test. Further, we explore not only the exogeneity of the complete
10We use all available lags and collapse the instrument matrix only for those potentially endogenous
variables that are not at the core of the analysis. We do so to maintain a maximum of information in the
estimation.
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set of instruments but also for specic subsets. As noted in Roodman (2009) a specic
subset of interest are the lagged di¤erences as instruments for the lagged dependent variable
(in the levels equation). We report a p-value for the di¤erence-in-Hansen test of the null
hypothesis of instrument exogeneity.11 And lastly, we use the nite-sample Windmeijer
(2005) correction and the two-step estimator to deal with heteroscedasticity and arbitrary
correlation patterns within countries.
Our strategy involves running several specications with a di¤ering set of control vari-
ables and using several di¤erent estimators. However, as outlined above, we obtain most
results from our preferred system GMM estimator.
4.2.2 Data and Variables
To obtain a large set of panel data with the regressors of interest and relevant controls,
we combine several data sources. These include the World Banks development indica-
tors, Barro and Lees educational attainment dataset, the comtrade dataset on exports
by category, the Penn World Tables, the Fraser Institutes World Freedom Index, and the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The countries in the sample are selected solely
based on data availability and the World Banks income classication. We include develop-
ing countries that are associated with either income group three, four, or ve.12 Summary
statistics are given in Table A1.
11As this is most crucial in system GMM estimation we report this diagnostic right within the estimation
results. However, other subsets of our instruments all pass the di¤erence-in-Hansen test of instrument
exogeneity (available upon request).
12Upper middle-income countries, Lower middle-income countries, Low-income countries with 2011 per
capita GNI of US$ 4 036-US$ 12 475, US$ 1 026-US$ 4 036 and less than US$ 1 025, respectively.
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Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the growth rate, averaged over ve years, of per capita manu-
facturing output. In analogy to common empirical growth estimations we relate output to
population, as this accounts for size e¤ects between economies and enables us to interpret
it as the populations penetration with modern sector production. Related measures are
the relative share of a sector in GDP, or the sectoral labor forces productivity. While the
former targets relative changes, the letter targets a specic growth channel. Even though
our focus is on neither, we make sure that our results are not at square.13 Manufacturing
output is taken as value added in constant 2000 US$ from the World Banks development
indicators (World Bank 2012), while the population gures are from the Penn World Tables
version 7.1 (Heston et al 2012).
Independent variables
Our subject of interest is the e¤ect of exports and institutions on manufacturing sector dy-
namics. First, we use manufacturing exports from the United Nations Commodity Trade
Statistics database (Comtrade 2012). Manufacturing comprises products in SITC cate-
gories 5 to 8. Again, we relate manufacturing exports to population gures to account for
size e¤ects and to achieve comparability across countries. Next, the Fraser Institutes Eco-
nomic Freedom Index (Gwartney et al. 2012) serves as an approximation of institutional
quality. It is scaled from 1 to 10, with 10 being the best developed institutions across
several dimensions including size of government, legal structure and property rights, access
to money, freedom to trade, and regulation of credit, labor, and business. The index is
often used in the literature, not least because it provides a long series of data and is thus
13 In (unreported) extensions we therefore also scale with GDP and see no contradictions with our core
results. Similarly, when taking out scale parameters, the results are maintained. The use of the sectoral
labor forces productivity greatly reduces the sample size and maintains results for exports.
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suitable for the panel analysis we perform with a time dimension of over 30 years.
Control variables
We would expect the amount of human capital available to impact the growth of a more
modern sector.14 In developing countries, manufacturing activities (in comparison to, e.g.,
subsistence agriculture) generally require the use of more complex technology which in
turn can only be put to productive use by an educated workforce. The absorption of
better technology should thus be facilitated by a more highly educated workforce. To ap-
proximate the level of human capital we mainly use average years of schooling of both males
and females. The data source is Barro and Lees educational attainment dataset (2010).
Another common determinant of growth is investments. Especially for a capital-intensive
modern manufacturing sector investments appear invaluable. We also include investments
in our regression to comply with standard empirical growth estimations (e.g., Mankiw et al.
1992). Next, foreign aid is also believed to impact especially on the manufacturing sector.
Rajan and Subramanian (2011) conduct an empirical investigation of this. According to
them, aid favors the domestic non-tradables sector over an export manufacturing sector
in that it a¤ects the real exchange rate. Empirically, they nd that recipient countries
perform worse in terms of their manufacturing sectors share in GDP. We control for the
impact of aid on manufacturing in our estimations using aid data from the World Bank
(World Bank 2012). We also use o¢ cial per-capita information on development aid and
assistance. Next, we include urbanization, which can be regarded as a driver of modern sec-
tor development in three ways. First, urban agglomerations provide easy access to a pool
of labor that can be employed in manufacturing. Second, geographical closeness facilitates
spillover e¤ects. Third, urbanization can also be regarded as a measure of modernization
14For a general account of human capital and growth see e.g. Barro (2001).
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in general (health, education, infrastructure). However, because urbanization can also be
easily thought of as an e¤ect rather than a cause, it is important to treat it as a potentially
endogenous variable. And lastly, natural resource dependence may also inuence modern
sector development and is therefore included. Several channels are suggested in the re-
lated literature (see e.g. van der Ploeg 2011). First, resource availability may divert funds
away from more benecial activities, of which the modern sector is certainly one. Sec-
ond, triggering conicts over rents, resource dependence also increases uncertainty, which
can a¤ect real investments and human capital accumulation negatively. Third, a boom in
natural resource exports can drive up the exchange rate and decrease competitiveness of
the manufacturing sector. For these reasons, we let natural resource dependence enter our
model. However, as the e¤ects potentially dependent on the institutional environment we
do not necessarily expect a strong impact in either direction. The data are drawn from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012) and represent resource rents as a share
of GDP, and separately its subcomponents oil, gas, coal, mineral and forest rents as shares
of GDP.
As mentioned in the introduction, recent research by Rodrik (2013) analyzes conver-
gence in manufacturing sector labor productivity. He nds unconditional convergence for
both two-digit categories and aggregate manufacturing activities, which leads us to also
account for conditional convergence across countries. We take the proposition of conver-
gence as a point of departure to derive additional driving mechanisms. Thus we set up
a base case with conditional convergence and add our proposed inuencing mechanisms,
namely exports and institutions. Technically, that means we control for -convergence by
including the lagged level of the dependent variable as a regressor. In our estimation we
include the beginning-of-period level of per capita manufacturing output as an explanatory
variable for the growth rate.
92
4.3 Results
Exports and Institutions Table 4.1 shows our estimation result for the rst set
of estimations. This set employs the strategy of estimating di¤erent model specications
with the same estimator, our preferred system GMM estimator. Later we turn to alter-
native ways of estimation. Column (1) shows the basic estimations of the e¤ects of our
regressors of interest. Both variables, exports and institutions, display an impact on manu-
facturing sector growth, which is positive and signicant alongside controls of convergence
and time- and country specic e¤ects. The next column includes controls for e¤ects other
than country, time, and convergence. We include a control for human capital and o¢ cial
development assistance (2), and also for urbanization and investments (3). In columns (4)
and (5) we present the estimations with an included control for natural resource rents (4)
and the subcomponent mineral rents (5)15. Even though the inclusion of further controls
reduces the magnitude of the main e¤ects they clearly remain signicant at the 1% level.
Further, including additional regressors forces us only slightly to reduce the sample for
data availability reasons alone. However, we see that this reduction does not change our
estimation results.
Given that the system GMM estimator rests on restrictive assumptions we discuss our
instruments validity based on common diagnostics. Almost all our estimations fulll the
required assumption about no serial correlation in the errors. According to the m2  test
we cannot reject the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation (in the di¤erenced
errors). Further, as the consistency of the estimator critically hinges on the validity of the
used instruments we conclude from the J-test conrmation that our set of instruments is
valid in the estimation. That is, the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments cannot be
15For brevity we do not show the results for other subcomponents of natural resources. They are similar
to the composite indicator in column (4). However mineral rents, which appear signicant, are maintained
throughout the following estimations.
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Table 4.1: Manufacturing Growth in Developing Countries - System GMM
Estimates
Dep. var.: Manuf. Growth All Countries
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Manufacturingt 1 -0.298*** -0.243*** -0.221*** -0.218*** -0.201***
(0.055) (0.074) (0.049) (0.052) (0.056)
Manuf. Exportst 0.184*** 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.114*** 0.119***
(0.041) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Institutionst 0.111*** 0.104*** 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.079***
(0.027) (0.037) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Schoolingt 0.016 -0.023 -0.016 -0.016
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018)
Urbanizationt 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Investmentst 0.085* 0.093* 0.069
(0.049) (0.053) (0.051)
ODAt -0.064** -0.040** -0.047*** -0.035*
(0.031) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
Natural res. rentst 0.003
(0.002)
Mineral res. rentst -0.015***
(0.004)
Implied  0.071 0.056 0.050 0.049 0.045
Observations 292 279 279 279 279
Countries 77 71 71 71 71
Hansen (p-value) 0.62 0.36 0.56 0.52 0.46
Di¤-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.65 0.50 0.91 0.86 0.79
Instruments 54 56 68 69 69
AR(1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) (p-value) 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.40
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is per capita Manufacturing Growth. Initial
Manufacturing, Manufacturing Exports, Investments and ODA are used in per
capita terms and natural logarithms. Natural and mineral resource rents are shares
of GDP. *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10-, 5- and 1% level, respectively.
Windmeijer corrected S.E.s in parentheses. All models are estimated with constant,
time- and country-xed e¤ects. Sample range is 1970 - 2005 in 5-year averaged
non-overlappingperiods. Di¤-in-Hansen test tests the instrument exogeneity of the
rst-di¤erences in the system-GMM levels equation (see text).
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rejected. Finally, we test for the validity of instrument subsets, that is, we test whether the
instruments for each endogenous regressor qualify separately as valid. The results indicate
that this is the case for almost all subsets.
Having established exports and institutions impact positively on the growth rate of
manufacturing, with a presumably well qualied estimator for dynamic panel data models,
we turn to estimating the full specication (i.e., specication (5) in Table 4.1) with alter-
native estimators. While column (1) in Table 4.2 replicates the estimated coe¢ cients in
Table 4.1, columns (2) to (5) represent the estimations with the di¤erence GMM estimator
(2), the LSDVC estimator (3), the xed-e¤ects estimator (4), and the cross-sectional OLS
estimator (5).
The estimated coe¢ cients for exports are positive and signicant across the various
estimators. Their magnitude is greatest among the GMM estimations, however signicance
is given at the 1% level across the board. The results for the institutions variable di¤er
slightly. The obtained results are positive and signicant (as the main estimation) in three
of the ve cases. The di¤erence GMM estimator and the OLS estimator do not conrm
a positive impact of institutions on modern sector development. The latter two results
are also from the smallest samples. While the di¤erence estimator reduces the sample
to 61 countries the cross-section OLS sample consists of only 45 countries. However, the
remaining signicant results are of a similar magnitude.
Control variables From the broad (theoretical) literature we would expect human
capital to enhance modern sector growth, for example as it facilitates the absorption of
modern technology. However, looking at our estimations we nd mixed evidence of a
positive impact of the level of human capital on modern sector growth.16 Even though it is
16 In fact this nding is in line with work of e.g. Pritchett (2001) who notes that especially in macro
estimations, as ours, the link may be weak.
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Table 4.2: Manufacturing Growth in Developing Countries - Di¤erent Es-
timators
Dep. var.: Manuf. Growth All Countries
Estimator: SysGMM Di¤GMM LSDVC FE cs-OLS
Initial Manufacturingt 1 -0.201*** -0.596*** 0.763*** -0.422*** -0.116***
(0.056) (0.147) (0.055) (0.048) (0.017)
Manuf. Exportst 0.119*** 0.198*** 0.062*** 0.092*** 0.045***
(0.039) (0.071) (0.021) (0.028) (0.010)
Institutionst 0.079*** 0.016 0.057*** 0.043** 0.034
(0.022) (0.053) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024)
Schoolingt -0.016 0.042 -0.005 0.008 0.011
(0.018) (0.061) (0.036) (0.040) (0.008)
Urbanizationt 0.001 -0.040*** -0.005 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Investmentst 0.069 0.061 0.131** 0.195*** 0.039**
(0.051) (0.170) (0.053) (0.048) (0.015)
ODAt -0.035* -0.007 0.012 0.012 -0.041***
(0.019) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) (0.009)
Mineral res. rentst -0.015*** -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 -0.012**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005)
Implied  0.045 0.181 0.054 0.110 0.025
Observations 279 201 279 279 45
Countries 71 61 71 71
Hansen (p-value) 0.46 0.64
Di¤-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.79
Instruments 69 37
AR(1) (p-value) 0.00 0.20
AR(2) (p-value) 0.40 0.81
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is per capita Manufacturing Growth rate,
except in the LSDVC estimation. The LSDVC models dependent is per capita
manufacturing output. Initial Manufacturing, Manufacturing Exports, Investments
and ODA are used in per capita terms and natural logarithms. Mineral resource
rents are a share of GDP. *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10-,5- and 1%
level, respectively. Windmeijer corrected S.E.s in parentheses. All models are
estimated with a constant, time- and country-xed e¤ects. Sample range is 1970
- 2005 in 5-year averaged non-overlapping periods. OLS estimates based on
complete period averages. Di¤-in-Hansen test tests the instrument exogeneity of
the rst-di¤erences in the system-GMM levels equation (see text).
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often times positive, in no estimation does the variable signicantly support modern sector
development. We measure human capital in average years of schooling. As summarized
in Glewwe (2002) the link between schooling and productivity may not hold in all cases,
especially not in Sub-Saharan Africa. That the links from schooling to skills to productivity
are not adequately given may explain our results.17 Next, we nd that investments are
positively related to manufacturing development. In most of our estimations we nd a
signicant e¤ect and thus support for the standard proposition that higher investment
levels support growth. This is expected, as manufacturing is on average more capital-
intensive than basic agricultural activities. By contrast, we do not nd much evidence
that urbanization signicantly supports manufacturing growth. In other words, we can
assume neither that there is a functioning link between a prospective labor pool and the
sectors activity, nor that a more modern environment has a positive impact. The latter,
however, may be due to the broad measure which urbanization is or that we may be
dealing with di¤erent types of urbanization as proposed by Gollin et al. (2013). One
fuels industrialization by supplying labor to the modern sector, while the other is based
on the consumption of, e.g., resource rents where people engage in low-productivity petty
services instead of high-productivity industry jobs. And next, we nd evidence of a negative
impact of o¢ cial development aid on manufacturing growth. While the e¤ect is smaller
in magnitude than our main e¤ects, trade and institutions, we can argue that o¢ cial
development aid is by no means a driver of structural change as it impedes modern sector
development. The proposed link via the real exchange rate (Rajan and Subramanian 2011)
may thus indeed put the manufacturing (tradable) sector at a disadvantage compared
to other sectors. However, very likely may also be the case that aid, by owing into
other sectors (health, education), makes the modern one less competitive in comparison.
17The use of other approximations for human capital available (e.g., secondary schooling in the labor
force, secondary schooling, primary schooling (all World Bank 2012) does not change our results.
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In the last two columns of Table 4.1 we present the results of natural resources as a
factor that impacts on modern sector development in our sample. The broad literature
on natural resource dependence proposes several channels, which are in short outlined
above.18 In column (4) we include natural resource dependence in our model and note
two aspects. First, our results hold, lending further credibility to our specication. And
second, which is almost equally interesting and important, we see no signicant impact of
natural resources on modern sector development. However, from this estimation we can
only infer that natural resources do not impede modern sector development controlling
for institutions, exports and human capital. All of these are major channels of impact
described in the natural resource literature. Another reason could be that natural resource
subcomponents (i.e., gas, oil, coal, minerals, and forests) show di¤erent e¤ects and hence
lead to a non-signicant overall e¤ect. We consider this second explanation and report the
most interesting result in column (5). For the minerals subcomponent we nd a signicant
negative e¤ect, even though we still control for the main channels of impact. We assume
mineral extraction in developing countries to have comparatively higher labor intensity,
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This may present a further constraint to modern sector
development as the labor force may be absorbed by the mineral mines. Our results suggest
that even though in general natural resources may not be problematic or even a curse,
individual resources may di¤er in their impact on modern sector development, as the
example of minerals shows in our estimation.
Convergence Our estimation results indicate that there is conditional convergence
in aggregate per capita manufacturing output growth. Countries with a lower prior level of
manufacturing output hence grow faster, as indicated by the negative coe¢ cients on initial
18See, e.g., Gylfason and Zoega (2006) or van der Ploeg (2011) for a discussion of channels through which
natural resources impact on growth.
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manufacturing output in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The convergence e¤ect is signicant across all
estimations. Our estimation is thus in line with the proposition of Rodrik (2013) concerning
the existence of convergence in manufacturing sector labor productivity, although in our
case it is conditional upon the set of control variables and not restricted to the labor
force. Nevertheless, our conditional convergence e¤ects are even similar in magnitude to
the ones estimated on labor productivity. To illustrate this, we report the implied  which
is the annualized rate of convergence derived from the coe¢ cient for our lagged dependent
variable.  solves 1 +  = e t , with  being the estimated coe¢ cient and t the time in
years between the current value and the lagged term, in this case t = 5.19 The annualized
rate of convergence in manufacturing is estimated at around 5% a year, while Rodriks
conditional estimations vary between 5 and 6%.20 Finally, from an econometric point
of view we gain condence that we model and specify correctly by comparing estimates
of the xed e¤ects, OLS and system GMM estimations. As argued by Bond (2002) the
estimates of the cross-section OLS model and the xed-e¤ects model represent upwards
and downwards biased estimates of the lagged dependent variables coe¢ cient. So the true
value should lie in between. In our estimations this is clearly the case for the system GMM
estimates.21
4.3.1 Extension
Having established the relevance of both institutions and trade for modern sector growth
we extend the estimations to improve and strengthen the results along two lines, namely a
di¤erentiation of institutions and trade e¤ects across income levels.
First, in the main analysis we use the broad measure of economic freedom from the
19For more details on convergence see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
20See Rodrik (2013), p. 176, Table 1, even-numbered columns.
21The simple (in contrast to the reported time-averaged) OLS levels estimation with all observations
produces an estimate of -0.14 for the lagged dependent variable, close to that reported in column (6).
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Fraser Institute. As the index is also available in subcategories, namely size of government,
legal structure and property rights, access to money, freedom to trade, and regulation of
credit, labor, and business we can also use these to approximate the quality of economic in-
stitutions more precisely (assuming that the index components are obtained in an unbiased
and comprehensive manner). First we exclude the subcomponent size of governmentof
the institutional quality index. We do so to avoid to rely on an indicator that is frequently
criticized for being ideologically skewed. A bigger size of governmentgenerally reduces
the institutional quality score, a procedure that may be regarded as questionable (column
1). Next, we reduce the index to legal structure and property rights and regulation of
credit, labor, and business (column (2)). Especially property rights are in this context
expected to be important (Johnson et al. 2002). In columns (3) we reestimate (2) without
investments, an important channel for institutional quality. And lastly in column (4) of
Table 4.3 we look at an institutional quality indicator from the international country risk
guide, namely socioeconomic conditions. First we see that our estimations remain robust
to a change in the institutions index in column (1). This index excludes the size of gov-
ernment score which comprises, among others, tax rates. Next, by focusing on aspects
of institutions promoting modern sector growth (column (2)), i.e., secure property rights
and the regulation of credit, labor, and business, which are more direct from a theoretical
perspective, we still estimate a signicant coe¢ cient as expected. However, this result is
not strengthened when we leave out investments (column (3)). The latter result is some-
what surprising as especially property rights are associated with modern sector growth via
enhancing the investment environment. A reconciling aspect might be that we capture the
investment level with a very broad indicator. The last column (4) shows that the insti-
tutional quality indicator from the international country risk guide is similarly positively
and signicantly associated with modern sector growth. Further the e¤ects of our included
control variables (especially o¢ cial development aid and mineral resource rents) do not
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change in this extension.
Next, we estimate our core model and interact our trade variable with dummies for
di¤erent income levels in the countries under investigation. We propose and perform this
exercise to evaluate whether our e¤ects are robust across this dimension and whether policy
implications can be generated across the board for di¤erent levels of income. We generate
quintile dummies according to the income at the end of the sample. In Table 4.4 we see
evidence that the impact of trade levels may well be connected to income group. While the
interaction with higher income levels generates the previously found evidence of a positive
impact, the rst quintile does not suggest a signicant impact of trade levels on modern
sector growth. The quintile-specic results are derived from the joint validity of the two
export coe¢ cients. We get the strong impression that countries at the lower end of the
income scale have not been able to boost modern sector growth through trading over the
time frame studied. Because trade levels are comparatively low in the lowest income group
we could argue that we are experiencing size e¤ects, meaning that the volume of trade is
not large enough to make an impact. Though this seems plausible when we look at the
levels, there is another possible explanation. As prior literature has shown, diversication
of exports (e.g., Berg et al. 2012) is benecial as it insures against drawbacks in specic
industries. We calculate the Herndahl diversication index across income groups and nd
that the lowest income group is least diversied in its manufacturing exports. We may
thus argue that the lack of diversication also plays a role in the relationship between
trade levels and modern sector growth. (cf. Table A4.1)
4.4 Conclusion
In this contribution we study the determinants of modern sector development and con-
tribute to the recently revived interest in modern sector development (e.g., Rodrik 2013).
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Table 4.3: Manufacturing Growth in Developing Countries - Di¤erent In-
situtions
Dep. var.: Manuf. Growth Fraser ICRG
Model: No GS PR & BR PR & BR Soc Econ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Manufacturingt 1 -0.218*** -0.224*** -0.230*** -0.200***
(0.067) (0.061) (0.065) (0.072)
Manuf. Exportst 0.095** 0.099*** 0.138*** 0.103*
(0.042) (0.033) (0.038) (0.057)
Institutions [2-5]t 0.051**
(0.020)
Institutions [2+5]t 0.075*** 0.062**
(0.028) (0.028)
Soc Econt 0.050**
(0.021)
Schoolingt 0.009 -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Urbanizationt 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Investmentst 0.085* 0.089*
(0.048) (0.053)
ODAt -0.044** -0.040* -0.037* -0.042**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.017)
Mineral res. rents t -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Implied  0.049 0.051 0.052 0.045
Observations 266 269 269 245
Countries 70 71 71 66
Hansen (p-value) 0.27 0.46 0.47 0.18
Di¤-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.22 0.64 0.84 0.24
Instruments 69 69 63 52
AR(1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) (p-value) 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.22
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is per capita Manufacturing Growth. Initial
Manufacturing, Manufacturing Exports, Investments and ODA are used in per capita
terms and natural logarithms. Mineral resource rents are a share of GDP. *, ** and ***
denote signicance at the 10-,5- and 1% level, respectively. Windmeijer corrected
S.E.s in parentheses. All models are estimated with constant,time- and country-xed
e¤ects. Sample range is 1970 - 2005 in 5-year averaged non-overlapping periods.
Di¤-in-Hansen test tests the instrument exogeneity of the rst-di¤erences in the
system-GMM levels equation (see text). Subcomponents of Institutions index:
Governement Size (GS 1), Property Rights (PR 2), Access to money (3), Freedom
to trade (4) and Business Regulation (BR 5).
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Table 4.4: Manufacturing Growth in Developing Countries - Income In-
teractions by Quintile
Dep. var.: Manuf. Growth
Model: 1st Quint. 2nd Quint. 3rd Quint. 4th Quintile 5th Quint.
Initial Manufacturingt 1 -0.277*** -0.268*** -0.276*** -0.247*** -0.267***
(0.056) (0.068) (0.076) (0.057) (0.066)
Manuf. Exportst 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.104** 0.093** 0.105***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.048) (0.046) (0.040)
Exportst x Inc1 -0.102***
(0.039)
Exportst x Inc2 0.005
(0.017)
Exportst x Inc3 -0.001
(0.009)
Exportst x Inc4 0.013
(0.014)
Exportst x Inc5 -0.002
(0.014)
Institutionst[All] 0.080*** 0.077** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.109***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032)
Schoolingt -0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.007 0.006
(0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.012)
Urbanizationt 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Investmentst 0.060 0.098 0.102* 0.108* 0.097
(0.047) (0.060) (0.060) (0.056) (0.062)
ODAt -0.039* -0.043** -0.047** -0.050** -0.054***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Mineral res. rents t -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.013** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Implied  0.065 0.062 0.065 0.057 0.062
Observations 279 279 279 279 279
Countries 71 71 71 71 71
Hansen (p-value) 0.50 0.51 0.43 0.52 0.53
Di¤-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.65 1.00 0.74 0.52 0.68
Instruments 69 69 69 69 69
AR(1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) (p-value) 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.41
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is per capita Manufacturing Growth. Initial
Manufacturing, Manufacturing Exports, Investments and ODA are used in per
capita terms and natural logarithms. Mineral resource rents are shares of GDP.
*, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10-, 5- and 1% level, respectively.
Windmeijer corrected S.E.s in parentheses. All models are estimated with
constant, time- and country-xed e¤ects. Sample range is 1970 - 2005 in 5-year
averaged non-overlapping periods. Di¤-in-Hansen test tests the instrument
exogeneity of the rst-di¤erences in the system-GMM levels equation (see text).
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We take manufacturing sector growth as a broader indication for the economic modern-
ization process in a developing country and ask for the determinants of this economic
modernization process. What are the drivers for growth and di¤usion of modern sector
production within the developing society? Our modern sector perspective shall capture its
role in long-run development and the sector as a source to provide fundamental societal and
economic change on a potential path towards higher stages of development and income.
Given the history of developed countries we technically focus on the drivers of manufac-
turing sector growth, namely trade and institutional quality. In a cross-section time-series
analysis we use several model specications as well as several panel estimators to obtain
robust results and account for potential econometric drawbacks, especially endogeneity. In
our sample of 75 developing countries from all developing regions of the world, we nd that
both exports and institutional quality impacted on manufacturing sector growth over the
sample period 1970 to 2005.
Our results for manufacturing exports indicate that a the di¤usion of a countrys mod-
ern production capacity is positively driven by exporting to international markets. One
possible reason is that developing countries can bridge domestic demand shortages for
manufacturing products by selling to the large global market. However, productivity and
spillover gains are also likely induced by exposure to international competition. Next, we
nd that the aforementioned positive impact is not uniform across income levels. The
poorest countries in our sample do not benet from trade, possibly due to their negligible
trade volumes that have no measurable impacts on the entire sector. In addition to low
export levels, these countries are also the least diversied.
Similarly, we nd that the quality of overall institutions is benecial for manufacturing
sector development. Our measure of institutional quality comprises several dimensions,
including secure property rights, a dimension hypothesized as being especially important
for capital-intensive manufacturing. Looking at this dimension more in isolation, we nd
104
evidence that this aspect is important, too, to modern sector development.
Further, we nd interesting results for our control variables. These include a nega-
tive impact of o¢ cial development assistance on modern sector development. That said,
natural resources generally do not seem to weaken a countrys likelihood of developing a
successful modern sector. However, this latter result is conditional on factors such as insti-
tutions or exports. Finally, our isolated analysis of mineral resources indicates that their
presence has a negative impact on the modern sector, giving rise to the assumption that
the mineral sector impacts via a di¤erent channel than other resources. We propose that
it is a labor-intense sector which absorbs human capital that would be needed to form the
manufacturing sector.
The implications of our results are twofold. First, even though trade in general may
not be found to be unambiguously positive for overall growth, we provide evidence that
when it comes to the modern sector, exports appear to be a largely important source of
growth. Thus, to enlarge the modern sector there need to be adequate export opportunities
for its products. And second, we also nd that sound (economic) institutions, especially
secure property rights, are vital to this sector. However, since we do not nd that exports
are relevant in countries with very low income levels, further research is required to gain
insights into how to encourage manufacturing sector growth in least developed countries.
4.5 Appendix to Chapter 4
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Table A4.2: Countries included
Argentina, Armenia, Benin, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chile China, Cote dIvoire, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala Guyana, Hon-
duras, Indonesia, India, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic,
Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Morocco, Moldova, Mexico, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique,
Mauritius, Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Niger Nicaragua, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Senegal, El Salvador Togo, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, South Africa,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
A reasonable assumption concerning the development of global population numbers is that
they will rise well above the current level until mid century, and possibly also well fur-
ther after that point. While global population growth itself may not be problematic, the
trajectory expects the rise to be concentrated and thus large in mainly poorly developed
regions. When excessive population growth numbers are negatively related to human and
environmental well being and development, which is certainly the case, a sound under-
standing of their drivers is crucial and an important aspect of explaining economic and
social development across poor regions in the world.
This thesis lls research gaps concerned with population development and its linkages
to structural, economic change. It emphasizes on the determinants of fertility, which has
been found to be the greater puzzle of the major two determinants of population growth
- fertility and mortality. Of the explanations for declining fertility the economic demand
theories are shown in this thesis to be of an integral part in determining future fertility
developments. The analysis indicates that the economic transformation towards higher
paying, human capital demanding job opportunities is a vital ingredient not only to increase
the standards of living, but also to lead to a demographic transition.
In more detail, this thesis shows that the era of global economic integration, the glob-
alization of trade and production processes, may also inuence demographic transition
trajectories in especially those countries that are located at the onset of the transition. A
108
formalized theory proposes that the human capital content of trade may determine whether
benets from trade are materialized and channeled towards either an enlargement of the
population or further education of the population. In a detailed cross-country estimation
it is conrmed that while primary exports show none, or a positive impact on reproductive
behavior the opposite is true for manufacturing exports. However, for this broad nding
two qualications have to be made. A split according to income shows that the least de-
veloped country group, which is the country group that potentially also faces the largest
increases in population, does not show the negative impact of manufacturing trade on fer-
tility. While this does not mean that the mechanism is absent, it may be the case that it
is too small to impact upon the country average fertility rate. And second, compared to
other factors the channel that is identied is relatively small compared to mortality and
education.
Modernization, in both, the economic and norms and value sense, appears to be an im-
portant driver of population change. Chapter three in this thesis underlines the importance
of sound, economic structural transformation to change a populations composition. The
clear and optimistic implication is that economic transformation will also deeply impact on
the populations composition and potentially receive a further boost from declining birth
rates and enhanced education. The nding that demographic change is deeply rooted in
and interacting with socioeconomic change, delegates policy advice also to the creation of
a modern economy with higher productivity jobs. Chapter four of this thesis picks up the
analysis of the determinants for development of a modern sector in developing countries.
The ndings underline that it is important for developing countries to obtain strong and
reliable institutions to spur investment in a modern sector and to integrate into the world
market in order to benet from spillover e¤ects within the sector that are related to com-
petition and productivity gains. However, again the analysis reveals that the mechanisms
may not be linear in the income group. Therefore, while policies that enhance institutional
quality and support export orientation may be benecial for countries beyond a certain
level of income, there is no evidence that this is also true in the least developed group. It
appears that the presented relationships are mostly relevant beyond a certain development
level.
An important avenue for future empirical research in this realm is to obtain more
detailed data and to establish relationships especially for the poorest countries. In the
near future detailed fertility data with increasing reliability will surely be present. Future
research may therefore benet from taking the broader positions presented in this thesis
to a close-up scenario. This may potentially also derive knowledge on least developed
countries, a group whose changes may not (yet) be captured in the broad cross-country
analysis presented here. While detailed (micro-) data may already be available for shorter
periods of time, the benets of long cross-section time-series data will be reclaimable in
the near future for this category of data as well. Especially the quantity-quality trade-o¤,
that has been tested for advanced economies with historical data, may become testable for
developing economies more directly as well. This would certainly underline the relevance
of economic forces in the determination of population development.
A main positive message from this thesis is that economic structural change will loosen
population pressure in developing countries once it occurs. To relate to the introductory
quote of Mohammad Yunus one may put forth that if taking care for itself as a society
entails creating jobs in positions above the subsistence level, a crucial characteristic of
structural change, curbing population growth directly and actively is no longer necessary.
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